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Abstract

Our principal inquiry revolves around the issue of touch and its relationship to
psychoanalysis, the latter of which traditionally relies on the medium of speech in order
to apprehend unconscious expressions. Why did psychoanalysis develop according to this
principle, and how was touch understood within this paradigm? In providing a
psychoanalytic account of touch, our analysis engages these questions by reviewing the
historical and cultural contexts out of which psychoanalysis, founded by Sigmund Freud,
emerged as a therapeutic praxis. Shifting from a predominantly historical and technical
account of psychoanalysis, we then consider the theoretical works of Freud in order to
explore how touch is implicated in the forces that propel psychical life. We are ultimately
led, by way of Lacanian psychoanalysis, to a series of missed encounters that defines
what is at stake for touch as a lost object, which is to say, as a lost object that incites
desire. Significantly, touch, as something fundamentally lacking, not only animates
human inter-subjectivity in a perpetual, corporeal reconfiguration, but it also calls into
question the signifying capacities of language that give meaning to our most carnal, and
craved for, encounters with one another.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, touch, haptic, Freud, Anzieu, Lacan, desire, drive,
prohibition, objet petit a, object a, technique, fort, da.
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Introduction
Psychoanalysis, as a theory that takes into account the fractal nature of human
sexuality, features touch as the means by which we precariously cross the fundamental
fault lines that structure psychosexual life. Contrary to the belief that sexuality is a
cohesive force or unitary substance inherent in all human life, psychoanalysis stages
sexuality as constitutively splintered and structurally discontinuous-a proposition that
counters any teleological argument or position that supports the assumption that human
sexuality comes pre-packaged with “natural” trajectories or fixed configurations of
desire. Snapshots of Sigmund Freud’s corpus confirm this fundamental insight every step
of the way: the perplexing nature of scenic dreamscapes that reveal (and conceal) the
myriad possibilities and configurations of sexual desire, the polymorphous perversity of
infantile sexuality, the manifold and heterogeneous manifestations of neurotic symptoms,
and the phantasies that germinate out of the Oedipus complexes of childhood. This
montage of psychoanalytic phenomena underscores the significance of the Freudian
discovery that problematizes any theory of sexuality that might seek to reduce touch to
the “feel-good” pleasures associated with sex. While sexual pleasure-itself a highly
subjective affair-does partially inform a psychoanalytic theory of touch, it does not
account for all the reasons that we postpone or deny ourselves these pleasures, maintain
physical distance between ourselves and others, become flustered at the inadvertent
touching of skin, and fantasize about the multiplicity of ways that we might touch or
avoid touching the other. In other words, psychoanalytic theory maintains that our desires
are never fully transparent to ourselves, that rather these desires stem from another scene,
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another locality, between perception and consciousness-a rupture or rift known as the
unconscious.1
Instead of describing the various ways that we engage others through the faculty
of touch, psychoanalysis examines how the unconscious structures our perceptions of
these engagements and our emotional apprehensions or responses to them. This means
not only surveying our day-to-day encounters with other people, but also taking into
consideration the role of phantasy in psychical life. For Freud, the emphasis in phantasy
is not placed on the images we conjure in our minds but rather on the elaboration of
unconscious desires or wishes that may not be immediately apparent or manifest to us. In
his discussion of the Freudian notion of phantasy Richard Boothby explains that unlike
fantasy, which pertains to the imaginary meanderings that occupy our conscious mind,
phantasy is “energized by the unconscious” and fundamentally “always contains an
aspect of something unknown and unknowable” (32). We find an example of
unconscious phantasy in Studies on Hysteria (1895), where Freud describes a particular
young woman who expresses her desire that Dr. Freud would take the initiative and kiss
her (302-03). Upon further analysis, Freud discovers that this wish is symptomatically
related to him and in fact can be traced back to a similar, albeit repressed desire relating
to an earlier event involving a different man. For Freud, however, tracing the analysand’s
memories back to this other man is only part of the mystery. After all, Freud tells us that

1
This idea of a split or disjointedness between perception and consciousness is advanced by Lacan
in his eleventh seminar, yet he remarks that this insight is simply restating Freud’s notion of “die Idee einer
anderer Lokaliidf’ (the idea of another locality) that represents the unconscious (56). While Freud
understands the unconscious as a dynamic system involving thought processes which are refused entry into
consciousness, Lacan reinterprets the Freudian unconscious as unconscious effects emanating from the
problem of representation inherent in language itself - that all language, insofar as it attempts to re-present
what it claims to stand in for, generates gaps and inconsistences in the chains and networks of meaning that
comprise, what Lacan calls, the symbolic.
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her “original” wish that this man would kiss her was also relegated to the unconscious.
Indeed, the cooperative work of Freud and Josef Breuer revealed that the origin of a
symptom could be traced back to the earliest scenes from childhood. The residues of
these scenes are remembered and become pathogenic, which simply means-at least for
Freud-that unconscious desire is bom out of conflicts in childhood that have to do with
curbing the sexual drives in relation to parental figures. This period of turmoil is more
commonly known as the Oedipus complex, a series of events when the child learns that
not everything can be touched and enjoyed at will-a painful lesson that becomes
entangled in the familial dynamics that are unique to each individual’s life history.
Phantasy therefore is always a means of re-staging desire, the conscious elements of
which may spring us into action but whose source is always unconsciously fueled.
Incidentally, the passage where Freud discusses the young woman who desires a
kiss is also the same passage where he introduces the term transference-a concept that he
insists elsewhere is a “universal phenomenon of the human mind” that has to be isolated,
A

sustained, and deciphered through analysis. Transference is the means by which
unconscious struggles and/or desires that are instigated in childhood are grafted onto the
relationship between analysand and analyst, forming an intense emotional connection.
Freud regards the transference-relationship as the means of putting into service the
analysand’s resistances, which provide signposts to previously repressed material.23 As a

2 Freud states this in “An Autobiographical Study,” going so far as to claim that “[transference]
decides the success of all medical influence, and in fact dominates the whole of each person’s relations to
his human environment” (42).
3 By “repressed material” we mean psychical content (i.e. representatives or delegates of sexual
impulses, hostile thoughts, forbidden desires, sadistic tendencies) that is deemed objectionable to the ego.
As the organizing agency that attempts to present a cohesive sense of “self’ to the subject, the ego in
Freudian theory is the first line of defense against the impulsive urges of the id, which contains die
impulsive and chaotic drives whose only aims are achieving satisfaction.
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theory that maintains that we act out or repeat behaviour that has pathogenic significance,
psychoanalysis prompts us to begin thinking about the ways in which phantasy and
transference are operative in how we psychically manage our physical and emotional
relationships with others.
How does psychoanalysis then, approach the subject of touch? Figuratively, touch
operates precisely in the unfolding of thought which psychoanalysis takes as its primary
concern. Freud states this explicitly when explaining the disposition of obsessional
neurotics insofar as they prevent a prohibited impression or activity from coming into
associative contact with other thoughts (“Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” 122).
More generally, the psychoanalytic method of listening to what one says and doesn 7 say
depends upon the ways in which the units of language are associatively linked and thus
traceable not only to the past, but more importantly to thought complexes that one is not
necessarily consciously aware of. Conversely, one would be correct in making the
assumption that touch, as an integral element implicit in materializing sexuality through
the corporeal body, would therefore hold a privileged place in psychoanalytic theory.
However, judging from our preliminary remarks, it is evident that psychoanalysis is
concerned less with aligning itself with the position of the body or the conscious mind
and more with understanding the significance of the unconscious in regards to psychical
life. With this in mind, it is not immediately clear precisely how the corporeal dimension
of the body impacts Freud’s psychoanalytic theories, much less how he accounts for the
ways in which touch-by which we mean the physical forms of contact between bodies
and oneself-gamers emotional and symbolic meaning.
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Considering the centrality of speech to psychoanalysis, it might seem like an
implausible theoretical orientation to instigate a discussion on the relevance of touch.
Traditionally theorists working within the field of phenomenology have spearheaded
questions relating to our bodily perceptions of how we experience the world.4 Rather than
abandoning psychoanalytic theory for a more developed account of the body and sense
perception, we wish to develop the theoretical implications of the distinctness of touch
within the realm of psychical life. Framed this way, we intentionally draw attention to the
inseparability of the mind and body that makes any discussion of contact between bodily
borders impossible without serious consideration of the role of the psyche. This
observation resonates with Alenka Zupancic who argues that the object of psychoanalysis
is precisely the zone where the somatic and mental overlap and the impasses that arise in
the wake of their crossing (7). Freud describes these impasses primarily in terms of
discord or conflict, which he saw as unavoidable friction between the sexual impulses of
the body and the organizational agency of the psyche.5 These impulses are central to his
theory of human sexuality and are generated by the primordial id, which Freud called
drives. Described as “a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in

4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology o f Perception (1945) is an exemplary exploration of
what it means to experience and perceive the world through the sense-faculties of the body. Another
compelling phenomenological account of the body is found in Drew Leder’s The Absent Body (1990)
where he scrutinizes the processes by which the perceptions of experience come into focus, often at the
expense of bodily presence.
5 The dynamics of the psyche are more complicated, and involve more agencies than indicated
here. In his discussion of his psychoanalytic technique, Freud explains more precisely what is at stake: the
ego, which is the organizational and “control center” of the psyche, has the tremendous task of managing
and pleasing not only the demands of the id, but also navigating the obstacles and impositions of external
reality, as well as abiding by the injunctions of the moral agency known as the super-ego. See “An Outline
of Psycho-analysis” (1938). While this brief summary is useful for introducing the key agencies in Freud’s
structural model of the psyche, it is necessary to remember that Freud envisioned this model as overlapping
with his earlier topographical model of the unconscious/preconscious/conscious. This amalgamation is
advanced in “The Ego and the Id” (1923) although Freud cautions that these two models do not seamlessly
coincide.
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consequence with its connection to the body” (“Instincts” 122), the concept of the drives
is, for Freud, one of the ways in which the body is represented in psychoanalytic theory.
However, to reduce the drives solely to bodily drives would defeat the tension that Freud
sought to capture in his paradigm of the mind/body relationship. In other words, we can
only experience the drives through the ways in which they find expression in the mind.
The concept of the drives is therefore an important element that will be included
in our exploration of touch within a psychoanalytic paradigm. Our intent is to get a sense
of how Freud understands the significance of the body in relation to his theories of the
unconscious and desire. Counter-intuitively, this approach does not focus on the path that
Freud himself laid out with respect to the conscious ego being “first and foremost a bodyego” (“The Ego and the Id” 26). While the body-ego is an important aspect of a
psychoanalytic account of touch, and will in fact inform aspects of our dialogue with
Freud and later on, Jacques Lacan, we are primarily interested in considering other
aspects of touch that require a more nuanced reading of the history and theory of
psychoanalysis. Chapter One will therefore begin with historically charting the ways in
which psychoanalysis emerged as a therapeutic practice, the evolution of Freud’s
psychoanalytic technique, the prohibition of touch in analysis, and the significance of
infantile sexuality. While this chapter will focus on the first two points in order to
contextualize Freud’s approach to investigating the unconscious in a manner that is
devoid of physical contact, the latter two points, which will be addressed primarily in
Chapter Two, aim to answer the following questions: How is touch implicated in the
drives? What is the significance of the prohibition against touching in psychosexual
development? How does touch elicit desire? In taking up two of Freud’s well renowned
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texts, “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905) and “Beyond the Pleasure
Principle” (1920), we will explore several aspects of the erotogenic body and the drives
in order to further contextualize how touch is understood from a psychoanalytic
perspective.
The question of desire in relation to the haptic field will be the primary focus of
Chapter Three. Building from the themes and ideas covered in the previous chapters, the
third chapter will integrate Lacanian psychoanalytic theory into our discussion on touch,
focusing especially on the game of fort/da invented by Freud’s grandson that is
introduced at the end of Chapter Two. This endeavor will bring into focus the
relationship between the rules of the game and the desire to touch while raising further
questions related to the body and the haptic field. Part of the difficulty and challenge of
working within a Lacanian paradigm is that Lacan rarely addresses the subject of touch
and often obscurely theorizes the body in relation to language and modules of enjoyment.
Thus the body in Lacanian theory tends to be crystalized in a reflected (visual) image,
displaced by the process of representation (qua signifiers), or embroiled in the painful
ecstasy of jouissance. Although our main concern will be theorizing the relationship
between touch and desire, we will also comment on the role of touch in constituting the
ego as well as the disruptive potential of jouissance.
A few brief asides: While not intended to be the focal points of our discussion, the
concepts of transference and phantasy will resurface as we traverse multiple interweaving
currents of psychoanalytic thought. Significantly, the discovery of transference altered
the trajectory of psychoanalytic theory and praxis. It is not without consequence that
Freud encountered this discovery when he was placed in an intimate situation whereby a

8

patient, upon waking from a hypnotic state, unpredictably threw her arms around his neck
(“Autobiographical Study” 27). While Freud dismisses his own “irresistible personal
attraction” as a possible catalyst for the embrace, one has to wonder about his reaction
when, at that moment, the space between himself and his patient unexpectedly evaporated
as their bodies pressed together. In other words, whether he recognized it or not, Freud in
that moment was confronted not only with the phenomenon of transference, but also with
the material presence of the body through which transference is acted out, including his
own. While Freud shares only a few details concerning the incident, it will nevertheless
be to our benefit to consider the circumstances surrounding it.
The significance of phantasy will resurface primarily in Chapter Three where we
address Lacan’s theory of the fundamental fantasy in relation to the object-cause of
desire. While we will not be directly speaking to the role of phantasy in Freudian
psychoanalysis, we do wish to briefly comment on the shift of its importance in
psychoanalytic theory-a shift that reflects Freud’s gradual movement away from the
immediacy of the body. This shift in Freud’s thought is most evident during the early
period of psychoanalysis when he withdrew his theory on the role of seduction in the
etiology of neuroses and instead emphasized the role of the Oedipus complex in
establishing unconscious phantasies. On the one hand, Freud believed early in his career
that most neurotic symptoms could be traced back to a traumatic, overwhelming sexual
experience from childhood, usually in the form of abuse. On the other hand, his later
theory that phantasies arising out of Oedipal conflicts shift the scene of sexual contact to
an internal screen confirms to Freud that in the cases of neuroses, psychical reality plays
a far more significant role in the formation of symptoms than material reality. Freud’s
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point here was never to refute the terrible atrocities of sexual abuse or its traumatic
effects, but rather to show that they did not account for the vast majority of neurotic cases
that he analyzed. Furthermore, Freud’s account of trauma increasingly moved towards an
orientation of belatedness that depended upon the retro-activation of unconscious
memories stemming from childhood. In other words, a traumatic event or memory is only
triggered with the advent of a later experience or the enlightenment of knowledge.67It was
not, as John Forrester points out, that Freud’s patients arbitrarily invented scenes of
seduction, rather the scenes themselves revealed details that were significantly associated
m

with later memories and symptoms (80). Phantasy therefore becomes the means of not

6 An excellent example of belatedness can be drawn from the case study of Little Hans. Little
Hans, like many young children, was curious about his body and particularly his genitals. From an early
age he enjoyed playing with his penis and deriving pleasurable sensations from such activity. His mother,
anxious about this manifestation of infantile sexuality, threatened Hans by instructing him to cease
touching his penis or she would have the doctor cut it off. At the time, the threat carried no meaning, as
Little Hans had not yet understood the symbolic significance of sexual difference. It was not until later,
during a bathing incident with his younger sister that he registered this visual difference, at which point his
anxiety-hysteria symptoms began manifesting. Crucially, Little Hans’s anxiety arose not from the
acceptance of sexual difference but rather from his refusal to believe it, signaling the work of repression.
See “Analysis of a Phobia” (1909). See also Rose (2005) for a Lacanian analysis of sexual difference in the
field of vision (49-82).
7 While Freud’s early work on hysteria postulates that hysterical symptoms manifest themselves in
men and women, his psychoanalytic writings reflect a disproportionate amount of case studies involving
hysteria in female patients. We raise this point not to dispute the seriousness of suffering on behalf of the
patient, but rather to illuminate Freud’s own personal biases. Forrester claims that Freud’s growing
familiarity with transference led him to “expect his patients to fall in love with him instead of telling him
about the lost loves of the past; they would offer themselves to him, seduce him, repeating with him what
had been thought or experienced in the past” (41). This claim draws attention to Freud’s own desires in
relation to his budding theories on sexuality, phantasy and seduction, as well as the power relations that
structure the analytic relationship. Forrester draws attention to the fact that psychoanalysis relies upon the
mobility of authority in speech, and furthermore that the command to “say anything that comes to mind”
places the analysand in a position where literally anything that is said will re-enforce the authority relation
between both parties by responding to the demand for speech. Forrester explains that on the one hand, we
have Freud urging his patients [presumably female] to share their most intimate phantasies or memories,
and on the other hand, “the shadowy figure of a man struggling with unknown desires for his patients...and
the urgent desire to inculpate the father” (41-42). The question becomes not only (as Forrester rhetorically
asks) “Who is seducing who?” but further, to what extent did Freud’s own desires - including his desire for
his patient’s phantasies to conform to his theories on seduction and sexuality - distort his perceptions of the
transference relationship?
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only staging the analysand’s most intimate desires, but also plotting its co-ordinates so
A

that the analysand may consciously confront them.8

8
Finally, we wish to draw attention to the terminology used by psychoanalysis to designate the
parties involved. When referring to those he treated with the psychoanalytic technique, Freud almost
always calls these individuals “patients” while referring to himself or the person overseeing the treatment
as the “doctor,” “physician,” or occasionally “analyst.” Due to the multiple designations that are used by
Freud, we wish to bring to the reader’s attention that terms such as “patient” and “analysand” will be used
interchangeably. Furthermore, because the term “analysand” is gender neutral, we will alternate our use of
male and female pronouns in reference to this person.
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Chapter One

“One has to put one’s finger on the truth, not on the body.” Didier Anzieu, The Skin Ego

Foreplay with Freud
In order to begin thinking about the role of touch in a psychoanalytic register, it
would be useful to make a few general observations to get us moving in the right
direction. For example, we can confidently assert that the human adult develops out of
childhood not without internalizing social norms and laws with respect to the ways that
one physically interacts with other people and oneself. This is to say that one learns
about, and is subjected to, the laws and prohibitions of touch that govern the body.
Indeed, some of the particularities of human behaviour are the distinct ways in which we
touch other human beings, what constitutes appropriate touching, where one may touch,
and under what conditions reciprocal touching is permitted and regulated. Failure to
follows these norms and rules may result in shame, disgust, embarrassment, discomfort,
and humiliation-affective states that signal that something has undergone a
transformation. Indeed, by expanding the definition of sexuality to include all forms of
“emotionally significant touching of skin to skin” (65), Boothby enables us to sympathize
with the Freudian position that draws attention to the precarious matter of psychically
managing the desire to touch and to be touched, an undertaking that is never without
conflict or restraint due to the remnants of each individual’s transition through the
Oedipus complex. For example, one need only recognize the extent to which infants and
young children display an insatiable curiosity to touch everything and do not yet
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demonstrate an awareness of the personal boundaries between themselves and others.
Here we should be mindful of one of the most common injunctions that infants and
children are subjected to-“Don’t touch!”9 Deployed under diverse conditions, this
prohibition, as well as its sanctioned exceptions, effectively zones and regulates not only
the relationship between the infant and its own body, but also the fundamental symbolic
relations that structure the psychodynamics of social life. The significance of the Oedipus
complex lies not in the prevention of actually killing one’s father or sleeping with one’s
mother, but rather in the painful acceptance of giving up the comfort and satisfaction
associated with one’s intimate ties to others in order to enter into the “civilized” cultural
and social spheres that are organized by the laws of language.10
In addition, there are the experiences of touch that break down bodily and
psychical boundaries, that unsettle or scatter one’s sense of self, leaving one feeling
vulnerable, confused, and/or overwhelmed; experiences that circumvent, and indeed
disrupt the meaning production generally guaranteed by language.11 These experiences
may involve a wave of sensations that impact the body, crashing over the surface of the
skin, and in certain circumstances, breaking through that protective surface. They may

9
This injunction, even in its most reduced form (“No”), relies entirely upon the recognized
authority of the person who prohibits or enforces the law, the intonation of the speaker’s voice, specific
signifying gestures (i.e. wagging a finger), and/or the brute force of physical punishment.
10
While the Oedipus complex is well known as the triangulation of the relationships between the
child and his or her parents (“mommy” and “daddy”), the symbolic significance of Freud’s theorization of
familial dynamics is certainly not lost on him. He comments that “The Oedipus complex has a merely
‘symbolic’ meaning: the mother in it means the unattainable, which must be renounced in the interests of
civilization; the father who is killed in the Oedipus myth is the ‘inner’ father, from whom one must set
oneself free in order to become independent” (“Psycho-analytic Movement” 62). The symbolic meaning of
the Oedipus complex in turn informs Lacan’s structural approach to the prohibition of enjoyment and the
instigation of desire that is not dependent on the heterosexual nuclear family model.
111 am indebted to my colleague, Sheena Yates, for suggesting to me the idea of touch as
“circumventing” one of the primary aims of analysis, which is to say, having the analysand tunnel their
thoughts and emotions into spoken words.
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also include disarming experiences that threaten the psychical borders that we have
defensively put in place, engendering the possibility of completely dissolving those
boundaries in an unintelligible moment of decompression and (self-)annihilation.
Conversely, the desires to touch, to reach out, to grasp, to embrace, or to unleash anger
and aggression, to lash out, and to hurl oneself violently toward another are passionately
animated by the internal forces of the body that spiral outward, pooling in (un)conscious
reservoirs until they overflow, inciting motility, movement, and crash-course collisions.
These depictions gesture towards the points of contact that condition all psychical life; a
reminder that phantasy is predicated not only on the perceptions of material existence, but
also imagining the possibility of transgressing those limits imposed by the body.
Registered on the surface of the body, the immediacy of touch blurs the boundaries
between the body that enjoys and the representational space introduced by the signifying
capacities of thought. Touch furnishes us with the inextricable means of registering
tactile experiences, generating the libidinal churning of the drives, and expressing the
insatiable nature of human desire.
Given the complexity of touch briefly sketched above, it is not altogether
unsurprising that Freud, in developing the fundamental cornerstones of psychoanalysis,
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maintained physical boundaries within the analytic relationship. Strategically, Freud
purposefully situated the analysand on the couch, lying down and facing away from him,
which he believed would safeguard the transference-relationship while enabling the
analysand to speak freely with as little outside interference as possible. Not only did
Freud absolutely forbid sexual relations between physician and patient, but his primary12
12
sexuality.

Specifically his theories on repression, transference, phantasy, wish fulfillment, and infantile
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interest of listening to and interpreting the analysand’s speech necessarily relegated any
form of physical touching as secondary to the primary aims of his psychoanalytic
method. This method entails the aforementioned technique of having the analysand
pledge to speak whatever thoughts came to his or her mind, otherwise known in
psychoanalysis as free association.
Freud did not invent the method of free association on a whim. Instead he
developed this analytic technique over the course of several years when psychoanalysis
was still in its infancy, during which time the prohibition against touching had not yet
been enforced. While the historical development of psychoanalysis is extensive and
sprawling, spanning over a hundred years during which it has splintered into a number of
ideological branches, we believe that it would be advantageous to review the early period
of Freud’s career in order to gain insight into his technical and physical approach to his
patients. As Freud’s theories on the unconscious origins of neuroses began to shift, so did
the technique that he employed in order to carry out analysis and implement treatment.
Our intent here is not to dispute the validity or effectiveness of free association, but rather
to investigate 1) the reasons that led Freud to the particular positioning and posturing of
the analysand in relation to the analyst and 2) the implications of Freud’s prohibition
against touch in analysis. Significantly, Freud’s prohibition against touching tells us
something crucial about this intimate form o f human interaction. In other words, if
psychoanalysis insists on the production of speech within the parameters of a unique
therapeutic relationship, it can only succeed in its aims by sustaining a particular physical
distance between analysand and analyst, the tension of which will vary depending on13
13
Freud explicitly states, “Real sexual relations between patients and analysts are out of the
question, and even subtler methods of satisfaction, such as the giving of preference, intimacy and so on, are
only sparingly granted by the analyst” (“Outline of Psycho-analysis” 176).
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individual circumstances. This is not to suggest that every analytic relationship develops
a physical tension that must be resolved in a sexual outcome (which Freud feared), but
rather speaks to a particular positioning that only allows bodies to communicate in a
specific way. It may also, as Les Kertay and Susan Reviere astutely observe, draw
attention to the symbolic significance of touch even in its absence. They advise:
If a therapist decides to touch a given patient, he or she must do so in a
thoughtful manner and must be willing to accept responsibility for the
patient’s interpretation of the touch. Likewise, if the therapist decides not
to touch, there must be a similar willingness to accept responsibility for
the meanings that the patient will assign to the absence of a natural form
of human contact. (16-17)
Here, the absence of touch does not necessarily guarantee the impersonal, objective, and
neutral position of the analyst (which Freud hoped for), but instead may gamer symbolic
meaning depending on the unique disposition of the analysand in relation to the analyst.14
Furthermore, as Elizabeth Mintz helpfully points out, the taboo on touching may, in some
patients, “elicit childhood feelings of deprivation and rejection . . . offer a repetition of
the childhood trauma of having physically detached parents . . . [or] gratify a neurotic
need to avoid intimacy,” all of which should be worked through in treatment (369). While
Freud’s rule against touching ensures the production of speech, which is by its very
nature a bodily speech act, the ramifications of sacrificing physical touch must be
accounted for rather than negated or held in abeyance. In surveying the early historical
period of psychoanalysis, we will try to understand how Freud’s evolving technique both
14
We find the implications of Kertay and Reviere’s argument compelling insofar as the absence of
physical touch still needs to be accounted for within the analytic setting. This topic (absence of touch) will
be more fully addressed in Chapter Three.
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placed the patient at a (physical) distance as well as endeavored to understand the
patient’s symptoms specifically through the transference relationship. In doing so, we
will draw out the theoretical implications in Freud’s analytic technique in order to broach
our broader questions involving the significance of touch in psychoanalysis.

Contextualizing Touch in the History of Psychoanalysis
Tellingly, in his meticulously detailed biography of Freud, Ernest Jones makes the
fascinating observation that rather than engage in active methods of experimentation and
investigation such as electrotherapy, Freud “chose instead to look and listen, confident
that if he could perceive the structure of a neurosis he would truly understand and have
power over the forces that had brought it about” (58). This passing remark reverberates
throughout the history and development of psychoanalysis for several important reasons.
First, it is helpful to remember that Freud began his professional career as a medical
student-a reluctant one at that. In his own account of the history of his life’s work, Freud
freely admits that he never felt any particular compulsion to become a medical doctor,
but was motivated towards “Human concerns [rather] than towards natural objects”
(“Autobiographical Study” 8). Nevertheless, Freud’s training in medicine and sciencethe study of “natural” objects-necessarily prefaced his career as a psychoanalyst where
he would be able to turn his attention to “human concerns,” which is to say, to
intervening and aiding those suffering from ailments that were rooted in unconscious
conflict. Second, Freud’s passive disposition to gathering knowledge in order to posit
theories about the unknown assuredly led him to the invention of the “talking cure” and
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adopting an approach to his patients that would minimize physical intervention.15 It
would also be this same disposition that would later spark conflict and controversy in
regards to the significance of touch in technique and transference.16
Notably there have been previous efforts to document the historical and cultural
contexts that frame the relationship between psychoanalysis and the taboo on touching. A
good example of this is found in Elizabeth Mintz’s essay “Touch and the Psychoanalytic
Tradition” (1969) where she suggests three factors that likely influenced Freud’s decision
to eradicate touch from the analytic setting: the cultural climate of Victorian sexual
prudery, the desire for analysts to establish themselves as scientists apart from the realms
of religion and magic, and Freud’s rejection of hypnosis, which was often combined with
therapeutic massage and stroking (367). With respect to her first point, it was to Freud’s
15 The term “talking cure” was conceived by Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim), a patient of Doctor
Josef Breuer. She also referred to this process as “chimney sweeping.” Evidently, the term “talking cure”
has remained embedded within cultural consciousness as opposed to “chimney sweeping,” obviously due to
the significance of speech in psychoanalytic therapy.
16 It should be pointed out that the issue of touch in analysis was contentious from the beginning of
its prohibition. For example, Freud strongly disagreed with the tinkering with his method by Hungarian
analyst, Sdndor Ferenczi. Their dispute is most famously known for their differing opinions on the role of
actively intervening in the transference relationship. A heated debate erupted between the two men when it
came to light that Ferenczi would kiss some of his female patients. In a letter to Ferenczi, Freud expresses
his disappointment that Ferenczi will not alter his technical approach, referring to his kisses as “little erotic
gratifications.” Adamant that all such physical gratifications are inherently sexual, Freud insisted that all
such interactions should be completely avoided. Further, he refers to these actions as tokens of “maternal
tenderness” and even refers to it as “the kissing technique.” “Why stop with a kiss?” Freud inquisitively
and accusingly asks Ferenczi. See The Correspondence o f Sigmund Freud and Sdndor Ferenczi 421-23.
The question undoubtedly has some merit with respect to the transference/countertransference relationship.
On the one hand, Freud recognizes the importance of addressing the reason why the desire for a kiss arose
in the first place. His emphasis on repetition necessarily draws attention to the aim of remembering and
putting into words, not acting out repressed conflicts, desires, aggression, etc. On the other hand, it also
speaks to Freud’s own fears that any form of touching would necessarily lead to “petting parties” or fully
developed sexual relationships that would foil the aims of analysis. In The Technique at Issue (1988),
Andre Haynal explains that the theory behind an active technique is that in certain controlled circumstances
non-erotic touch could be used to re-instigate a stagnant analysis where the analysand’s free associations
have halted or come up against strong resistances. It is Haynal’s opinion that “Freud aspired to create a
situation comparable to a laboratory in order to satisfy his scientific ideals, as he conceived them, and the
scientific nature of psychoanalysis, in particular that what is brought to the fore is not induced by the
activities of the analyst Freud felt that being overwhelmed by sexuality, regression and psychosis
constituted a threat to this imago” (31).
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great disappointment that as he began publicly unveiling the connections that he was
making between sexuality and neurotic symptoms, he was countered with public outrage
and disproval. Mintz argues that in such a heightened atmosphere it was probable that
Freud sought to minimize physical interaction in order to avoid claims of depravity. In
addition, it is likely that Freud removed the element of physical touch from analysis once
he had discovered the effects of transference-love. In regards to scientific standards and
Freud’s rejection of hypnosis, we will expand on these points in order to contextualize
how Freud’s medical training and personal relationships affected the role of touch in the
development of psychoanalysis. Furthermore, in rehearsing these historical details, we
hope to show that psychoanalysis, as a discourse and therapeutic practice, required its
own suppression of touch in order to develop into a dynamic theory of the unconscious.
Freud, our “reluctant doctor,” began his medical studies at the University of
Vienna in 1873. The experience was disappointing for several reasons, yet Freud
applied his youthful energy and curiosity towards the study of biology and anatomy,
eventually coming to work under Ernest Briick, a professor of physiology whom he
greatly admired.1718 Jones confirms this, stating that Briick influenced Freud more than any
other figure in his life precisely because he represented the ideal that Freud strove to
achieve: “that of scientific integrity combined with a whole-hearted faith in its ethical
value” (44). Indeed, as Jones indicates, Freud strongly desired the intellectual discipline
that science, as a discourse concerned with objectivity, exactitude, measurement, and
17Freud discloses that he was most disappointed by the expectation that he should consider
himself “inferior” and “alien” because he was of Jewish heritage. He defiantly claims that he found these
expectations ludicrous and refused to allow them to influence him.
18 Jones mentions another instructor (Carl Claus) whom Freud worked under prior to Brtlck. He
speculates that part of the reason that Freud felt animosity towards the former and admiration towards the
latter was to do with their ages (Claus was twenty years Freud’s senior, Briick forty years his senior) and
how they likely reminded him of his half-brother and father respectively. A curious analytical insight.
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precision, could offer him (37). It was also during this time that he demonstrated a
proficient understanding that in order for scientific knowledge to evolve, it was necessary
to observe a given field, collect the facts, organize a working theory, and speculate on
what remained unobservable. Jones notes that it was these skills that would enable Freud,
years later, to advance his psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious (57). Evidently,
these early years depict a young man driven to understand the biological side of life with
great precision and detail. He was patient and preferred laboratory observation as
opposed to more invasive forms of research. This resonates with Jones’s opinion that “an
active role in life would not have suited him,” arguing that Freud favoured methods of
investigation that were non-intrusive and insisting that he had “a pronounced passive
side” (59) and “preferred research over practice” (65). These biographical remarks draw
attention to Freud’s passive temperament, which combined with his growing desire “to
bring human feelings and conflicts into the orderly framework of the intellectual, rational
and mechanistic science of his time” (Mintz 367), surely guided his approach to medical
research and eventually the human psyche.
In 1881, Freud belatedly obtained his Medical degree and then, following Briick’s
advice, accepted a position at Vienna General Hospital in 1882. Eventually, after several
years of hard work, Freud was awarded the coveted position of Privat-Dozent in 1885 by
way of his appointment as a Lecturer in Neuropathology.19 It would also be later the same
year that he would be bestowed a highly coveted travel bursary which would allow him

19
Jones explains that this prestigious position had no exact equivalent in American or British
Medical Schools. While a Privat-Dozent was not entitled to attend Faculty meetings or receive a salary, the
individual was allowed to instruct a certain number of classes, often outside the regular curriculum. Freud
longed for this position from the beginning of his medical training, not only for the professional standing,
but also because it increased his prospects of securing a medical practice that in turn would provide him
with the financial means to marry (Jones 77-78).
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to go to Paris and study under the famous Jean-Martin Charcot. While he only spent a
little over four months as a student at the famous Salpêtrière in Paris, Charcot’s influence
on Freud cannot be underestimated. This had mostly to do with the growing momentum
in Freud’s research that pertained to the study of nervous disorders, and by extension,
hysteria.20 He was greatly impressed with Charcot’s flourishing theories on hysteria,
particularly his methods of proving its validity, adherence to specific laws, and frequent
occurrence in men, the latter of which was believed to be improbable by the medical
community at the time. Furthermore, Freud was intrigued by the implications of
Charcot’s demonstrations, which provided evidence supporting the fact that hysterical
symptoms could be induced through hypnosis (13). For Freud, this discovery confirmed
that regardless of the unknown neurological grounds for hysteria, symptoms had a
psychogenic origin (Jones 250). Evidently, Freud’s exposure to Charcot’s theories and
remarkable demonstrations noticeably inspired fresh ideas and new directions for his
research. As Jones points out, “it was assuredly the experience with Charcot in Paris that
aroused Freud’s interest in hysteria, then in psychopathology in general, and so paved the
way for resuscitating Breuer’s observations and developing psychoanalysis” (83).
Significantly, this perceptive observation indicates there were several concurrent
developments that were unfolding during this time, including Freud’s flourishing
friendship with Josef Breuer, a highly respected Viennese family physician. Freud
explains that he met Breuer while still working in Briick’s laboratory and that they

20
Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis summarize hysteria as a class of neuroses that can be further
specified into either conversion hysteria or anxiety hysteria, both of which arise out of a psychical conflict.
In the case of conversion hysteria, the outcome of this conflict is symbolically expressed through somatic
symptoms, such as emotional outbursts accompanied by theatrical gestures or parts of the body rendered
insensitive to pain or subject to paralysis. In the case of anxiety hysteria, anxiety is attached to an external
object in the form of a phobia. See Laplanche and Pontalis 194-9S.
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developed an intimate friendship whereby they came to share all of their scientific
interests with each other (“Autobiographical Study” 19). This camaraderie proved most
beneficial when Breuer informed Freud of a case of hysteria that he had treated “in a
peculiar manner which had allowed him to penetrate deeply into the causation and
significance of hysterical symptoms.” Freud’s interest in this particular case study only
added to the growing momentum in his research on the origins of neuroses, for it was his
involvement in Breuer’s treatment of Anna O. that would lead him to realize the
importance of sexuality to the onset of neurotic symptoms and the discovery of the
unconscious.21
Freud’s growing preoccupation with nervous disorders necessarily required that
he adopt specific research methods in order to carry out his investigations of the human
mind. In these regards, he admits that at the time he only had two methods of treating
nervous patients: electrotherapy and hypnotism (“Autobiographical Study” 16).
Intuitively sensing that electrotherapy was a useless form of treatment, Freud quickly
disposed of this method in favour of hypnotism. While this decision aligns with our
earlier comments regarding Freud’s preferred passive approach to research, it is more
likely that Freud found hypnotism an attractive alternative primarily because those he
respected, such as Charcot and Breuer, endorsed its effectiveness. Intrigued by Breuer’s
use of hypnotism to investigate the source of Anna O.’s symptoms, Freud observed that
there was psychical activity operating behind the scenes, which is to say, not on any level

21
We wish to drawn attention here to the Freudian discovery of the unconscious, which is to say,
the first systematic investigation into the unconscious that takes sexuality as its prime concern. The idea of
an unconscious predates psychoanalysis and can be found in the writings of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von
Schelling, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. More broadly, the origins of dynamic psychiatry
have extensive and richly textured histories, dating back to the end of the eighteenth-century. See
Ellenberger, The Discovery o f the Unconscious (1970).
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of which the patient was consciously aware. Freud was particularly attuned to the
significance and dynamics of affect, and how managing emotions and impulses was
related to the emergence of symptoms as well as the contrast between conscious and
unconscious processes. He also quickly realized that it was not enough to simply
command the symptoms of the hypnotized patient to cease. Instead, he found it more
productive to inquire as to the source of the symptom. In other words, he would ask
questions relating to when the symptoms first arose, which were usually traceable to an
emotionally traumatic event. In the case of Anna O., her symptoms were related to a
series of events where she had suppressed thoughts or impulses related to her ill father
whom she was caring for at the time. The symptoms themselves astonishingly manifested
through various parts of her body, the process of which is known as hysteria
conversion. Breuer’s treatment involved not only putting this patient into a deep state of
hypnosis, but also re-routing the quota of affect that had become siphoned off from
“normal” channels in the service of maintaining the patient’s symptoms
(“Autobiographical Study” 22). His treatment became known as “cathartic” because it
sought to discharge this misplaced affect that had arisen due to emotionally distressing
events. It also focused on instructing the patient to speak about his or her symptoms as
opposed to the strictly hypnotic method of giving commands and ordering the symptoms
to cease. Enthralled with the productive results of the cathartic technique and its potential
to answer some of his own questions about the human mind, Freud adopted this technical
aspect into his own practice. Freud, however, was not completely satisfied with Breuer’s
theories on the origins of hysteria. While he gives Breuer credit for being responsible for2
22
Jones lists these symptoms as ranging from “paralysis of three limbs with contractures and
anaesthesias, severe and complicated disturbances with sight and speech, inability to take food, and a
distressing nervous cough” (245-46).
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the founding ideas out of which psychoanalysis would evolve, Freud differed in opinion
on the etiology of hysteria. Contrary to Breuer’s theory that hysteria was the result of a
lack of communication between apparently altered mental states, Freud believed that the
splitting of the mind was the result of a defense against a threatening impulse or thought.
Nevertheless, it was only by way of their combined efforts to trace back the origin of
hysterical symptoms that Freud and Breuer discovered that the patient’s associations
always overshot the suspected scene of conflict, which is to say that the pathogenic
material responsible for engendering symptoms originated much earlier than the event
that had triggered the neurotic outbreak (“Psycho-Analytic Movement” 10). Further
disagreement arose between the two men because of their different opinions on this
discovery. The inadvertent discovery of these early childhood memories and associations,
combined with Freud’s increasing belief that all neuroses were sexual in origin, was
decidedly the beginning of a radical shift in Freud’s thought-a shift which paved the way
for psychoanalysis to emerge.

O'X

A Question of Technique (to touch or not to touch?)
The question of whether touching is appropriate between analyst and analysand is
a taboo topic that dates back to the earliest period in the history of psychoanalysis. The
subject is still highly contested in psychoanalytic circles and generally it is agreed that
any form of touch should be prohibited in analysis. Notably, Freud used forms of touch23

23
Freud explains that his epiphany concerning the central role of sexuality in the formation of
neuroses was directly related to comments made by three Viennese physicians whom he highly respected:
Breuer, Charcot, and Chrobak. Freud claims that all three men made comments about sexuality (the
marriage bed, virginity, the male genitals) in relation to nervous patients (“Psycho-analytic Movement” 1315). Elsewhere, Freud insists, “What I had heard from them lay dormant and inactive within me, until the
chance of my cathartic experiments brought it out as an apparently original discovery” (“Autobiographical
Study” 24).
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as a part of his analytical technique prior to 1900 as a means of accessing unconscious
memories and associations, which thus prompts several questions: what purpose did
touch serve with respect to psychoanalytic aims? When and why did Freud cease using
touch as a means of facilitating analysis? What does the prohibition against touch tell us
about the significance of touch in psychoanalytic theory?
The modifications of Freud’s technique can be traced according to three waves:
the aforementioned hypnotic technique, the yet to be discussed mental concentration or
“pressure” technique, and the famously known method of free association. While we
have already discussed the first technique at some length, we nevertheless find it
interesting that Freud abandoned hypnosis as a form of analytic technique precisely after
the awkward embrace with his patient.24 The topic, however, requires some further
elaboration. Prior to addressing this event, Freud discusses the period of time following
the publication of Studies on Hysteria, specifically the tail end of his professional
relationship with Breuer. Puzzled by Breuer’s unwillingness to collaborate with him on
his theory of the importance of sexuality in the etiology of neuroses, Freud comes to the
realization that Anna O. had, in the course of her treatment, developed a condition of
transference-love in her relationship to Breuer (“Autobiographical Study” 26). This erotic
attraction, however, was not a one-way street. According to Jones, who claims that Freud
provided him with the full account of what happened, it was Breuer who developed a
countertransference with Anna O.. Once Breuer realized the true meaning behind his
engrossed investment in his patient, he ended the treatment. Later the same day he was
summoned to attend to Anna O. who had abruptly developed phantom pains originating
from the manifestation of a hysterical childbirth (Jones 246-47). While both accounts
24 At least according to the linear narrative provided in “ An Autobiographical Study.”
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apparently stem from Freud, they perplexingly tell different versions of the same story.
Regardless of whether the transference travelled one or both ways, it was this element
that would play a part in Freud’s decision to seek out alternative techniques.
Freud’s passing mention of transference-love allows for him to reflect upon the
incident involving the embrace with his own patient. He recalls that hypnotism had been
quite productive in his treatment of this particular patient and that he had been successful
in tracing back the origins of her symptoms. “As she woke up on one occasion,” Freud
writes,
she threw her arms around my neck. The unexpected entrance of a servant
relieved us from a painful discussion, but from that time onward there was
a tacit understanding between us that the hypnotic treatment should be
discontinued. I was modest enough not to attribute the event to my own
irresistible attraction, and I felt that I had now grasped the nature of the
mysterious element that was at work behind hypnotism. In order to
exclude it, or at all events to isolate it, it was necessary to abandon
hypnotism. (“Autobiographical Study” 27)
Freud’s choice of words here is fitting, for is it not that he literally grasped the
“mysterious element” behind the work of hypnotism when his patient embraced him? In
other words, Freud tacitly understood in that moment that the manifestation of physical
contact, when initiated by the patient, was as significant as any other symptom and
therefore needed to be analyzed. The concept of transference (the “mysterious element”)
necessarily highlighted, as Mic Hunter and Jim Struve point out, “the importance of the
analyst’s understanding and attention to the unconscious meanings of body contact” (54).
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Freud was thus faced with not only the impending question of how touch signifies, but
also the question of the other’s desire, which he believed could only be answered through
sustaining and isolating the transference rather than allowing the patient to impulsively
act on his or her wishful phantasies.
Freud’s discovery of the phenomenon of transference was not his only reason for
dispensing with hypnosis. In Studies on Hysteria Freud recounts many of his frustrations
with the hypnotic technique, including his own inability to ensure a consistent success
rate with subduing the patient to a somnambulistic state. In his own words, he was “faced
with a choice of either abandoning the cathartic method in most of the cases which might
have been suitable for it, or venturing on the experiment of employing that method
without somnambulism” (108). He then recalls his visit to Nancy where he witnessed a
remarkable feat by Hippolyte Bemheim, who enabled a recently hypnotized woman to
recall all of the details of the events that had occurred while under hypnosis simply by
placing his hand on her forehead. From this demonstration, Freud realized that his
patients must know, on some (unconscious) level, everything that he had tried to have
them recall while being in a hypnotic state. Inspired by this turn of events, he
consequently dispensed with hypnosis and instead asked his patients to lie down, shut
their eyes, and concentrate on whatever came to their mind. As Freud explains, he
“decided to start from the assumption that my patients knew everything that was of any
pathogenic significance and that it was only a question of obliging them to communicate
it” (110). When he encountered any resistance on behalf of the patient to recall memories
or details, he proceeded in the following way:
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I placed my hands on the patient’s forehead or took her head between my
hands and said: “You will think of it under the pressure of my hand. At the
moment at which I relax my pressure you will see something in front of
you or something will come into your head. Catch hold of it. It will be
what we were looking for. - Well, what have you seen or what has
occurred to you?” (110)
The description of his technique is quite striking. One gets a sense that Freud believes
that unconscious thoughts can be almost palpably touched. On the one hand, he
encourages his patient to envision whatever comes to mind and then “catch hold of it.” In
conjunction with these instructions, Freud applies and withdraws pressure to the patient’s
forehead, as if physically drawing out the source of the patient’s symptoms. Indeed, as he
explains in “An Autobiographical Study,” he hoped that the use of touch would grant him
the power of forcing the forgotten facts and connections into consciousness (28). This last
comment reinforces Freud’s view that the physician’s authoritative position plays a key
role in the success of treatment in the patient. In this case, the laying on of hands is
granted the power to facilitate healing, which is to say, granted by the patient who
believes that the doctor can cure him or her from their suffering.25

25 Forrester provides a useful and critical commentary on the relations of knowledge and power
that psychoanalysis inherited from the discourses of science and medicine. “Hypnotism,” he writes, “acted
as a recasting of the ancient conception of medicine as both science and art and set the scene for the
twentieth-century embodiment of the doctor as ‘artistic’ healer-the psychoanalyst” (31). As Freud shifted
from the use of hypnosis to the mental concentration technique, which incorporated elements of Breuer’s
cathartic method as well as the presence of touch, so did the authority relations that governed the
doctor/patient relationship. Forrester explains that it was no longer a matter of instructing the patient what
to do, but rather insisting that the patient continue to speak in order to give meaning to his or her symptoms
(36). While the doctor (Freud) still retained the authority over defining the parameters by which treatment
would be facilitated, the patient was elevated to a more prominent status precisely because she
(unconsciously) knew something about her symptoms that the doctor did not. The “pressure technique” also
relied upon this re-structuring of power/knowledge relations, whereby placing the hand on the patient’s
forehead was accompanied by the assurance that she would discover the significant idea or image once the
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There are, however, some ambiguities in Freud’s use of the pressure technique. In
a footnote to Studies on Hysteria, James Strachey calls attention to the fact that there are
minor inconsistencies surrounding the technical aspects of the procedure. For example,
Freud reports giving alternative instructions as to when exactly the patient would recall
the significant mental material (i.e. when he applies pressure to the forehead, as he
removes his hand from the forehead, or during the entire time that he applies pressure). It
would seem that incorporating the element of touch into his practice was still highly
experimental, and as it turns out, short-lived. While Strachey suggests that Freud’s use of
hypnotism fell somewhere between the years 1887 and 1896, it is more difficult to
pinpoint when exactly Freud stopped using the pressure technique. This is mostly due to
the fact that while Studies on Hysteria records his first implementation of the pressure
technique, he never subsequently declared in any publication that he had ceased using it
as an analytic technique. Later, however, once free association was established as the
technique of psychoanalysis, he explicitly stated that this method purposefully avoided
touching his patients “in any way, as well as any procedures which might be reminiscent
of hypnosis” (Mintz 367; citing Freud in 1904).26 This remark not only supports Mintz’s
argument that Freud wanted his new technique of free association to stand apart from the
hypnotic method and its derivatives, but also that he purposefully avoided any form of
physical contact with his patients. Unfortunately, Freud does not directly comment on the
subject of touch in relation to the clinical setting in any of his later writings.

hand was removed. This technique was paired with what would become the fundamental rule of
psychoanalysis: say whatever comes to mind, no matter how obscure, embarrassing, trivial or obscene.
26 Strachey confirms that Freud’s discontinuation of the pressure technique must have occurred
prior to 1904 because of a comment he made in a contribution to a colleague’s book on obsessions, stating
that he avoids touching in any way. According to Strachey it is likely that Freud’s “no-touching” rule had
come into effect some time around the turn on the century.
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Evidently, the general rule of speaking whatever comes to one’s mind, an element
of which had been present in Breuer’s cathartic method and featured much more
prominently in Freud’s mental concentration technique, eventually came to dominate the
technique of free association. This refined technique emphasized the rule of non-omission
and notably the prohibition, or at least minimization of any form of touching between
analysand and analyst. Turning to Freud’s 1913 paper, “On Beginning the Treatment,”
we find details that describe the renowned analytic situation. Freud, referring to the
rituals of analysis as “ceremonial,” defends his decision to situate the analysand on the
couch firstly for the historical reasons out of which psychoanalysis arose (133). He also
insists that this positioning is a personal preference that many others share with him,
stating that he cannot stand to be stared at for eight or more hours a day (134). His
assumption that he would be the object of his patient’s intense gaze notwithstanding, he
makes the case that after such extended periods of time his own unconscious (or for that
matter, conscious) thoughts regarding the patient may surface through his facial
expressions. In order to guard against any rash interpretations on the patient’s behalf, it is
necessary to enforce the visual prohibition so that the course of analysis will not be
affected. Lastly, and in line with the latter justification, Freud writes that this procedure
is necessary in order to isolate the transference and to enable it to develop specifically in
relation to the analysand’s resistances.
Notably, Freud does not mention the rules regarding touch in this paper, rather
choosing to comment only on the significance of vision in the analytic relationship-a
dissymmetrical relationship considering the privileged scopic position of the analyst in
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relation to the analysand who is not granted the same vantage point. The positioning of
the analysand on the couch therefore necessarily implies the rules regarding touch
without them needing to be stated. The couch thus acts as an anchor, a domain, and a
soapbox where the analysand remains immobile yet is positioned to speak freely. Freud
notes, however, that a large number of patients are resistant to this unequal positioning,
which places them at a visual disadvantage. Regardless of the patients’ requests to alter
this arrangement, visual and thus tactile prohibitions must be enforced. Above all else,
the most important aspect of the analysis is drawing out the transference-resistances so
that they may be worked through and analyzed. Significantly, Freud writes, “So long as
the patient’s communications and ideas run on without any obstruction, the theme o f
transference should be left untouched. One must wait until the transference, which is the
most delicate of all procedures, has become a resistance” (139). What Freud means is that
as long as the analysand continues to free-associate without pausing, forgetting,
mumbling, making contradictions or slip-of-the-tongues, no resistances have yet been
encountered in the course of analysis. It is only when resistances cause the analysand’s
speech to stumble or emotions to run high that the analyst needs to be particularly attuned
to the circumstances and associations surrounding the change in dynamics of the
transference. Only once a resistance has been triggered must the transference be touched
upon-another apt choice of words by Freud. He then raises a pragmatic question related
to the transference: “When are we to begin making our communications to the patient?”
Verbal communication, for Freud, is a means of symbolically touching the analysand
through the medium of words rather than direct bodily contact. We must not be too hasty,
however, to assume that it is simply a matter of the analyst conveying to the patient the27
27

Sec Anzieu 139.
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meaning of their symptoms once they have become apparent. Freud cautions that such
action can swiftly derail an analysis without hope of rectification. Communicating
material to the analysand is not the key to overcoming symptoms, but rather is a means of
providing the analysand with signs that point to the unconscious source of conflict. In this
way, the analyst must be cautious of how much knowledge to impart to the analysand in
order to ensure that the latter follows his or her own path of associations as well as works
through any subsequent resistances. Freud argues that even if a patient is made aware of
repressed material, she lacks the connections that would lead her to the place where these
thoughts are contained. “No change,” Freud writes, “is possible until the conscious
thought-process has penetrated to that place and has overcome the resistances of
repression there” (142). Phallic imagery aside, the significance of this sentence shifts the
emphasis from how the analyst touches the analysand with words to the way in which the
analysand undergoes personal transformation through the joint processes of signification
and emotional catharsis. Touch figures here as a form of self-reflexive signifying action
that involves tactfully combatting one’s resistances while re-structuring pathways that
lead to previously inaccessible thoughts or affects, the process of which is often
experienced as profoundly unsettling. Whether this breakthrough involves making a
critical connection, remembering a traumatic event, or acknowledging a previously
disavowed desire, the key component to this process is the symbolization of an unknown
element that in turn shatters the analysand’s conception of herself. Words then become a
means of building new bridges and support; a way of structuring a holding pattern, an
embrace that incorporates this new knowledge and allows for self-composure from a
radically altered point of view.
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Psychoanalysis thus relies upon the non-physical meanings of the verb “to touch”
in order to facilitate treatment, which is to say, the definitions of touch that include the
following significations: to guess or state correctly; to produce tender or painful feelings
in; to make a difference to, affect; to affect mentally or morally; to influence a (person) in
mind or will. Appropriately, the context of “in touch” also defines the parameters of the
analytic relationship: a close relationship of communication, agreement, or
understanding. These meanings of touch, however, only gain currency in psychoanalytic
discourse and practice at the expense of its primary root meanings: to put the hand,
finger, or other part of the body on (a thing); make physical contact with (a thing) with
the hand, an instrument, etc.; bring (two things) into mutual contact; to bring into
physical contact with.28 As psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu puts it, “the drive to grasp is
dissociated from its bodily support, the hand,” and further, “one has to put one’s finger on
the truth, not on the body” (140). Defending the Freudian prohibition against touch,
Anzieu argues:
One must say anything, so long as one finds words that are both
appropriate to the transference situation and that express thoughts suited to
the actual nature of the patient’s suffering. The analyst’s words symbolize
without actual contact being necessary: the symbolic reality of the
exchange is more effective than its physical reality. (154)
According to Anzieu (and by extension, to Freud), the root of unconscious conflicts must
be rendered in the analytic situation through the exchange of (verbal) signifiers rather
than the exchange of physical gestures, erotic caresses, condoling embraces or violent

28
All definitions relating to touch were taken from the sixth edition of the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary (2007) 3303-04.
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blows. Furthermore, the kind of affective touching that words facilitate exceeds the limits
of what physical touch can effectuate, which is precisely what Anzieu means when he
states that symbolic reality is more effective than its physical reality. It is not simply that
words “touch” per se, but rather that the capacity of words to transcend their
communicative function recalls how the sheer force of language originally collides with
the passions of the body and becomes inseparable from it. While psychoanalysis works
through the medium of words, its main concern is with addressing that which has not yet
been symbolized and becomes pathological; language is therefore a means of negotiating
the dimensions of reality that remain caught between the bounds of rapture, torment,
trauma, and pain. It was not that Freud zeroed in on sexuality because of its tendency to
incite scandal, but rather because he recognized that the sphere of the sexual resists
translation, the “errors,” remnants, or untranslated fragments of which psychoanalysis
takes as the starting point of its analysis of the human condition.
Returning to the clinical setting, we find further reasons to uphold the prohibition
against touch. Aware that most of Freud’s clientele was comprised of women suffering
from hysterical symptoms “who eroticized vision (by spectacular self-display and by
staging sexual phantasies) and who were looking for a close physical relationship
(desiring to be touched, caressed, held),” Anzieu suggests that it was necessary to
introduce tactile and visual prohibitions into the analytic setting in order to “introduce the
requisite distance so that a relation of thought could form-a psychical space, the
development of a self-observing faculty from within the Ego” (140). Conversely, as
Anzieu remarks, another set of complications arose with obsessional neurotics for whom
the analytic situation fosters an “erotization of thinking, phobic fear of contact, fear of
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contagion and a dread of being touched.” In both cases, the psychodynamics of space
take central stage wherein the analysand is highly attuned to the significance of physical
distance or nearness and the associative content that relates to his or her symptoms.
Furthermore, in tracing the movement of Freud’s hand from the painful spots of the
(hysteric’s) body to the (fore)head where “unconscious pathogenic memories are active,”
Anzieu remarks that these points of contact with the body necessarily risk eroticization.
He suggests that even touching the forehead may be perceived as an erotic gesture.
Reflecting upon one of his patient’s dreams, Anzieu shares the intimate details of the
scene that possibly point to residues from waking life.29 In the dream, Anzieu invites the
young man to sit down on his lap, at which point Anzieu kisses the young man on the
mouth, gazes into his eyes, places his hand on the young man’s forehead, and whispers
into the young man’s ear, “Tell me everything this brings into your mind” (138). This
erotic, seductive scene reveals the mobilization of desire through the field of vision that
frames the physical encounter. It tells us something about the eroticization of vision, but
what of touch? Notably, Anzieu recalls that the patient woke up angered at his analyst’s
misconduct, not immediately realizing that it was he who had authored the dream. While
it is difficult to know if it was the perceived inappropriateness of professional conduct, or
the element of eroticism that garnered such a volatile response, the response itself signals
proximity to an unconscious thought or desire relating to the prospect of the dreamt
encounter.
♦

29
It is not clear whether or not Anzieu actually used the “pressure” technique in his own practice.
Rather, it is implied through recounting the details of Ms patient’s dream.
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We thus arrive at our first pivotal juncture in our discussion of touch. The path
that we’ve been following has traced the development and fine-tuning of Freud’s
technique and has begun to explore how touch is utilized in analysis according to the
non-physical, affective-laden attributes inherent in the signifying force of words. This
aim, however, overshadows the potency of physical touch that Freud sought to put at
arm’s length. In other words, the prohibition on touch in psychoanalysis functions not
only as a means of fulfilling the requirement of free association, but also tells us
something about the desire to touch and its relationship to sexuality and the drives.
Significantly, the rules of analysis mirror the first prohibitions enforced in childhood: you
may not touch or gesture, instead you must use words to communicate what you mean.30
Touch, however, is also a form of communication; one that in fact predates the
acquisition of spoken language within the span of human development. Specific forms of
contact, such as the mother’s breast, or the object used to provide nourishment, against
the infant’s mouth, are among the first signifying sensations. In this instance, physical
contact communicates to the infant that the arrival of nourishment is imminent.
Undoubtedly, forms of touching can also provide the infant with a sense of stability,
security, warmth, and comfort-in short, communicating to the infant that it is loved. Still,
even after one has learned to speak, the immediacy of touch appears to be the precise
moment when one is often at a loss for words, when language, usually quick to come to
our aid or express what we mean, arrives noticeably a posteriori. Whether Freud was
aware of this dimension of touch is unclear, however he certainly did recognize the
intimate bond between infant and maternal figure that had to be broken in order to

30 Also, you may not sleep with your analyst. Or kill him.
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prevent the perpetuation of this incestuous relationship. Touch, then, must have some
carnal relationship to the drives, even if that relationship is not yet clear.
It is thus to this period of infantile life that we now turn. In doing so, we aim to
excavate aspects of Freud’s theories relating to infantile sexuality that will allow us to
move into a discussion on the role of touch in psychosexual development. This discussion
will largely focus on the theory of the sexual drives that Freud advances in “Three Essays
on the Theory of Sexuality,” but will also gradually move towards addressing the
question of desire in relation to the haptic field (Chapter Three). It is not without merit
that we move from the circumstances surrounding the analytic relationship to the period
of infancy and childhood. Reiterating his points relating to remembering and repetition,
Freud insists that the (reproduction of symptomatic behaviour has infantile roots, which
is to say that it is rooted in the derivatives of the Oedipus complex that have been
subjected to repression (“Beyond” 18).31 Psychoanalysis takes seriously this primal
period of infancy and childhood-primal insofar as this period of human development
contains selective experiences that are traumatically constitutive in shaping the contours
of psychical life but significantly can only be approached retroactively. One of the ways

31
The concept of repression is one of the cornerstones of psychoanalytic theory. Freud theorizes
two forms of repression: the first form of repression he calls “primal repression.” This difficult concept
accounts for the founding of the unconscious and allows for pathways by which subsequent repressions
may take place. These subsequent repressions are what Freud refers to as “secondary repression,” or simply
just “repression.” This second form of repression is one of the defense mechanisms of the unconscious
portion of the ego. Freud argues that repression takes place when representations (thoughts, images, words)
of the drives are refused by the ego and are forced to undergo transformations in order to find alternative
forms of expression (and ultimately, satisfaction). With respect to symptom formation, it would be more
accurate to say that symptoms arise only from ^.failed repression, which is why symptoms are also called
“the return of the repressed.” A symptom may be expressed only because the (ideational) representative of
the drive has undergone distortion and does not trigger the defenses of the ego.
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that psychoanalysis attempts to access these primal scenes is through phantasy, although
Freud discovered that dreams were also the means of staging these scenes.
Arguably the first primal scene is that of the traumatic event of birth, the violent
separation of mother and child that engenders the very possibility of touch. However, in
his discussion on anxiety and its relation to the event of birth, Freud ultimately decides
that what is important is “what recalls the event and what it is that is recalled”
(“Inhibitions” 135). This position resonates with his theoretical shift from actual scenes
of childhood seduction (sexual abuse) to the phantasies relating to infantile sexuality and
the Oedipus complex. It is also crucial to point out that from the beginning of life,
sexuality itself is experienced as a force that is inherently overwhelming and disruptive.
Tim Dean, following Freud, makes this claim explicit, emphasizing that children are both
physically and psychically unprepared for sex. “The human infant,” Dean writes,
“encounters sexual impulses-its own as well as other people’s-as alien, unmasterable,
unassimilable to its fledgling ego, and hence ultimately traumatic” (232). It is not clear,
however, whether or not a drive to touch or be touched is inherently sexual. True, as we
will see, touch clearly plays a fundamental role in generating the tension or force that is
associated with the sexual drives, although it is at this point uncertain if, for instance, the
drive to grasp (an object) or to embrace (another person) would be within the Freudian
realm of sexuality. One of our tasks will be to explore the body as it is represented in
Freud’s texts, the physical presence of which he increasingly put at a distance not unlike32

32
Freud believed that the primal scene was primarily to do with the infant or child witnessing for
the first time his parents having sex. The concept of the primal scene was featured prominently in the case
study of the Wolf Man, who dreamt of a pack of wolves perched on the branches of a walnut tree, looking
intently at something. Freud’s first analysis of the dream is that the Wolf Man must have witnessed, in
actual reality, his parents having sex from behind (sex a tergo), however by the end of the case study he
detracts the importance of whether or not the scene actually happened and instead places the emphasis on
the content of die dream and its relation to the patient’s symptoms. See “An Infantile Neurosis” (1918).
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his ceremonial approach to analysis. Freud’s gradual shift away from the immediacy of
the body gestures not toward the separation of mind and body, but rather points to the
problems inherent in thinking the corporeal body and conversely the painful and
pleasurable expressions of sexuality that disrupt the faculties of thought that attempt to
systematize and regulate psychical life. It is precisely in the concept of the drives that
Freud sought to capture these expressions of sexuality that exert pressure on the mind and
consequently impel us to seek out satisfaction. Yet he also recognized that the demands
of the drives are not always compatible with the organizational ego or the moralizing
superego, and consequently are not allowed to persist unrestrained. With this in mind,
several important questions arise with respect to our interest in a psychoanalytic account
of touch. Is touch “merely” the physical contact that enables the drives? What is the
significance of touching in infantile life? What does the nature of repetition tell us about
the drives? And finally, if forms of touching are prohibited, how might the effects of
those prohibitions go beyond the physical boundaries they are intended to regulate?
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Chapter Two

“The deviation of drives is a constitutive deviation.” Alenka Zupanciá, Why Psychoanalysis?

(A few remarks) On Sexuality

Our brief introduction of the drives at the end of the previous chapter prompted a
thorny question: is there any form of touching that is not sexual for Freud? This is
admittedly a difficult question to answer. We must remember that Freud is primarily
interested in the components of sexuality that are incompatible with the interests of the
ego and superego and thus may be subject to psychical processes such as repression or
sublimation.33 The proliferation of neuroses that he aims to treat with the analytic method
relies upon a clear understanding of the centrality of infantile sexuality in relation to the
pathology of symptoms. Sexuality takes the central stage-this point is indisputable from a
psychoanalytic perspective. That stated we should be mindful of forms of touch that are
integral to self-preservation from the beginning of life. By this we mean instances where
touch is integral to learning about one’s environment, keeping oneself warm,
communicating with others, and protecting oneself from danger. These aims, however,
are never completely separate from the realm of sexuality, and to try and think them apart
from the sexual drives would in fact undermine the Freudian discovery that sexuality
inhabits all domains of human life (Zupancic 19). Rather than, for example, compiling a
list of what is and is not “sexual” touching, a more productive approach would be to
consider the centrality of sexuality to infantile life and the ensuing vicissitudes that the
33
Briefly, the Freudian understanding of sublimation involves the process by which libido is
diverted to non-sexual aims, which may involve activities and objects that are socially and culturally
valorized. For an explanation of repression, see page 35n31.
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human infant must endure in order to become “civilized.” It is not simply a matter of
desexualizing or draining the erotic component of touch, but rather being attuned to
complex range of emotions and coping strategies that are involved with the
psychodynamic management of the relationship between one’s body and the external
world.
The topic of infantile sexuality concerns one of three sections that comprise
Freud’s “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.” Originally published in 1905, “Three
Essays” represents a dangerous foray into the subject of sexuality-at least for its timeparticularly the morally incomprehensible “perversions” of “normal” sexuality as well as
the dynamic and polymorphous dimensions of infantile sexuality. Significantly, Freud
was compelled to repeatedly return to this text over the next twenty years in order to
more fully develop his previous ideas, add new insights, and provide additional footnotes
to supplement the text. “Three Essays” is an important text because it reflects an early
Freud who was still trying to figure out the enigma of sexuality and how it fit into his
larger psychoanalytic framework. On the one hand, there are clearly moments in this text
when Freud falls back on biologism, believing that certain psychical operations find
support in phylogenic dispositions.34 On the other hand, it is in this text that Freud
discovers sexuality as something that radically departs from the needs of the
physiological body. A curious tension arises between Freud’s recourse to the body-a
physical, neurological thing-and his growing conviction that sexuality cannot be

34
For example, Freud describes a period of latency that follows the resolution of the Oedipus
complex when children build up mental forces such as “disgust, feelings of shame and claims of aesthetic
and moral ideas” (“Three Essays" 177). He argues that this development is “determined and fixed by
heredity, and it can occasionally occur without and help from education.” Furthermore he adds, “Education
will not be trespassing beyond its appropriate domain if it limits itself to following the lines which have
already been laid down organically and to impressing them somewhat more clearly and deeply” (177-78).
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explained solely by its organic origins. The drives emerge as a border concept designed
to account for both the functioning of the physical body in connection to the psychical
apparatus to which it is bonded.35
In continuing with our argument for a psychoanalytic understanding of touch, it
will be necessary to explore how the concept of the drives significantly alters our
approach to the haptic field. The robust nature of the drives is not so much concerned
with the tactile properties that may be ascribed to the external world, but rather with the
passionate forces that bring us together, tear us apart, and sometimes compel us to act in
ways that only invite injury and suffering. Undergirding this impulse to act is the defining
characteristic of the drives, which Jacques Lacan emphasizes as “a konstante Kraft, a
constant force” {Seminar X I 164). Implicit in this constant force is the compulsion of the
drives, which in Freud’s account, are undoubtedly connected to the erogenous body and
the variants of satisfaction.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine the significance of the drives
in relation to Freud’s theories on sexuality in order to clarify the relevance and status of
touch within this paradigm. We will begin with a general overview of Freud’s first draft
of the drives in “Three Essays,” paying close attention to his descriptions of the
erotogenic zones of the body, the guiding principles of mental functioning, and the
specific components that comprise the drives. Once we broach the subject of repetition35
At this point we would like to draw the reader’s attention to the translation of the German word
Trieb, meaning both “instinct” and “drive” in the English language. In James Strachey’s official translation
of The Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, the word Trieb has been
rendered exclusively as “instinct,” even though Freud does occasionally use the German word Instinkt in
his writings to mark the distinction between the two terms. There is unanimous agreement in contemporary
psychoanalytic circles that Strachey’s mistranslation of Trieb undoes the uniqueness that Freud aimed to
capture by the concept of the drive, which significantly was supposed to stand apart from any notion of
“instinct” or the register of need. For clarification’s sake, all in-text citations will replace the word
“instinct” with “drive,” except for instances where the title of a major work is referenced (i.e. “Instincts and
Their Vicissitudes”).

42

the symptom par excellence of the drives-our analysis begins to shift from the realm of
sexuality to that of aggression, sadism, and mastery. This “sinister” turn introduces
another pole into the conceptual apparatus of the drives, generating a tension that Freud
finds extremely intriguing and compelling. In much the same way that water cannot be
broken down beyond the elements of hydrogen and oxygen, the component drives, for
Freud, cannot be reduced to any other forces other than sexuality and aggression.
Nowhere is this the most apparent (and at times, the most confusing) than his
reformulation of the drives in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” according to the life and
death drives.36 In working through a fresh set of problems that these twin drives introduce
into our discussion, we will capitalize on the game of fort/da that Freud reflects upon in
order to demonstrate how the multiple aspects of the drives surface in the repetition of the
game. The final section of the chapter will consider several remarks made by Didier
Anzieu on the prohibitions on touching that will compliment our analysis of the fort/da
game as well lead us toward our encounter with Lacan in Chapter Three.

Dissecting the Drives
Freud introduces the concept of the drives in the chapter on “The Sexual
Aberrations” where he commences a study on the variations of the sexual object and aim,
insisting that “The relation between these deviations and what is assumed to be normal
requires thorough investigation” (136). With respect to the “sexual object,” Freud has in
mind the person towards which the sexual impulse or urge is directed. The “sexual aim,”

36
Our consideration of Freud’s concept of the drives bypasses his secondary revision whereby he
posited the existence of “ego-libido” and “object-libido.” The reader should consult “On Narcissism; An
Introduction” (1914) if they wish to learn more about this aspect of his work as we will not be doing so
here.
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on the other hand, gestures to the act by which the drive achieves satisfaction-a
deceptively simple term that we will return to shortly. Freud’s consideration of
inversion,37 fetishism, bisexuality, sadism and masochism, and infantile sexuality, reveals
the versatility of the sexual aim and object-a discovery that explodes the previously held
assumption that men and women are naturally attracted to one another and that this
attraction is primarily intended to facilitate the process of reproduction. This not only
speaks to his discovery that the components of the sexual drives are capable of
undergoing alterations, but more profoundly, as Zupancic cleverly suggests, that
“sexuality is a paradox-ridden deviation from a norm that does not exist” (15). By
breaking sexuality into analyzable components, Freud not only enabled a re-orientation
with respect to thinking the issue of sexuality, but he also challenged steadfast cultural
beliefs about sex that had been upheld by modem science and medicine in his day.
Undoubtedly the scope of Freud’s insights from “Three Essays” has yet to be fully
realized, even now, a hundred years after its original publication.
At the outset, we would like to bring the reader’s attention to Freud’s conception
of the erotogenic body that provides a foundation for the drives to be manifested. While it
is indisputable that the sensations of the body can be ascribed qualitative properties,
Freud instead emphasizes the features of the body that are highly responsive to pleasure
and pain by focusing on the erogenous zones: skin and organs that are sensitive to
stimulation. Freud is particularly interested in zones of the body that are more sensitive
and more easily excitable than others, such as the mouth, the genitals, the nipples, and the
37
A term used to designate homosexuality at the time Freud was writing “Three Essays.” It would,
however, be more accurate to state that by “inversion,” Freud was specifically interested in cases where the
sexual object is inverted, and not necessarily the sexual aim. Furthermore, he not only concludes that there
is a varied range of homosexual desire, but also defends it against claims of degeneracy and problematizes
the assumption that sexual desire (homo- or otherwise), with respect to its object, is innately acquired.
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anus. That being stated, he also recognizes that because the entire surface of the body is
comprised of this erogenous material, skin is the erotogenic zone pear excellence (“Three
Essays” 169). An important aspect of Freudian theory is pertinent here: Freud equates
virtually any excitation of an erogenous zone with sexual excitation. This excitation is
what generates libido-the very energy or force that undergirds all mental functioning and
is inherently sexual. Freud originally defines libido as “a quantitatively variable force
which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of
sexual excitation” (217). Significantly, Freud argues that libido “is derived not from the
so-called sexual parts alone, but from all the bodily organs.” Clarifying further, ZupanSic
specifies that the “energy” Freud is concerned with is not simply a general energy that
operates within the parameters of the functional body, but rather a surplus energy that is
related to “the supplementary satisfaction that serves no immediate function and satisfies
no immediate need” (18). This supplementary satisfaction introduces an element that
irrevocably unbalances the economy of mental functioning in a productive way. For
Freud, sublimating or redirecting libido is what makes possible the achievements of
civilization: art, cuisine, cinema, fashion, architecture, amusement parks, and so forth.
Our relationship to all of these things is defined by the element of enjoyment involved,
which at its root is, for Freud, inherently sexual.
There is a second aspect-a principle in fact-that is related to mental functioning
and should be touched on prior to a dissection of the drives. This principle concerns the
particular way that Freud deploys the words “unpleasure” and “pleasure.” From a strictly
quantitative or economic perspective, Freud views any increase of internal excitation (i.e.
hunger) that registers in the conscious mind as agitation or tension as “unpleasure.”
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Therefore “pleasure,” according to Freud’s paradigm, is associated with a reduction of
this tension to a consistent, minimal level. Maintaining this minimal level of excitation is
what Freud has in mind when he assigns it the designation “principle of constancy.” In
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” he restates this principle as the “pleasure principle,” or
the hypothesis that “the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation
present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant,” justifying this claim by
logically assuming that any increase of excitation in the mental apparatus will be
adversely experienced and therefore viewed as unpleasurable (9). However, as Freud is
forced to admit, we only have a tendency towards the pleasure principle, which is to say
that it is impossible to maintain this state of constant or minimal excitation. Why? Upon
entering into the world, whereby the infant is physically separated from its mother, it
suddenly finds itself in a constant state of need. By virtue of the constant pressure of
having to satisfy these needs, it is impossible from the perspective of the organism to
preserve a state of little or no excitation. Not only does the infant have to contend with
these internal disturbances, he also has to rely upon the external world in order to satisfy
these needs. This reliance necessarily implies that the infant must accept the
postponement of satisfaction whether he wants to or not, or as Freud puts it, he must
comply with “the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and
the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure”
(10). Freud groups these conditions under the “reality principle,” which supersedes and
extends the aims of the pleasure principle. The shift from the pleasure to the reality
principle opens up the possibilities for the drives to undergo their vicissitudes, the
outcome of which cannot be determined or predicted in advance. Another way of stating

this is to say that the primal forces of the body, which are only known through their
relationship to the mind or psychical apparatus, become entangled in the material,
cultural, and social worlds into which the infant is bom. Refusing to exclusively assign
sexuality to either nature or nurture, Freud views sexuality in all its myriad possibilities
as a peculiar something that is permanently out-of-place, or as others have suggested,
something that irrevocably displaces the idea of what it is to be human.
In “Three Essays,” Freud’s conception of the drives begins with the basic
understanding that human beings begin life in a constant flux of need that results in the
heightening of excitation or tension in the infant. We are, as Freud would say, all
narcissists from the beginning of life. By narcissistic, Freud means that the infant is
primarily concerned with the overwhelming sensations, chaotic impulses, and unbearable
tensions originating within the vicinity of what we can tentatively call awareness or
consciousness. However, the infant’s lack of control in relation to its own body and
environment, between which there is not yet a clear distinction, signals that the ego has
not yet taken form as the primary means of organizing and differentiating sensations as
well as relegating and restricting the constant impulses of the body. These impulses,
Freud tells us, have to do with the vital functions of the body, which is to say the
processes of the internal organs that are responsible for digestion, oxygenation,38
38
Making the similar arguments from a Lacanian position, Tim Dean asserts, “sexuality is
explicable in terms of neither nature nor nurture, since the unconscious cannot be considered biological —it
isn’t part of my body and yet it isn’t exactly culturally created either. Instead, the unconscious may be
grasped as an index of how both biology and culture fa il to determine subjectivity and sexual desire” (221),
while Patricia Gherovici insists that sexual identity “is not determined by biology or any other innate
factor,” but rather “is learned through a language that one is bom into and through the given dynamics of
identifications” (5). From a Freudian perspective, Zupaniii argues that drive’s ability to split off and seek
out alternative forms of satisfaction not dependent on the register of need places us affirmatively in the
realm of human sexuality. More radically she argues that ‘the sexual’ (precisely the alternative forms of
drive satisfaction) in Freudian psychoanalytic theory is in fact “not the anchor-point of irreducible
humanity” but rather “the operator o f the inhuman” (20). For her complete argument, see “Sexuality and
Ontology” in Why Psychoanalysis? (2008).
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circulation, hydration, and excretion. Let us not forget that these processes not only make
continuous demands on us, but are also in constant motion: skin and muscles require
warmth and movement, the lungs take in oxygen and remove carbon dioxide, the heart
pumps and circulates blood to all major organs of the body, and the digestive tract
incorporates nourishment and expels liquid and solid waste. Most of these processes
necessarily require contact with the erogenous zones that tend to localize at the apertures
of the body and are susceptible to gamering the infant’s attention and interest as she
progresses in psychosexual maturation. This point is crucial, for while Freud attempts to
pin down specific zones of the body that can be generalized into a classification of stages
(oral, anal, genital) and universally applied, what is most important are the ways in which
these zones take on particular significance, form chains of associations, and generate
pleasurable sensations that will be contingent upon a combination of physiological
conditions as well as social and symbolic interventions.
Addressing the drives under the subsection “Component Instincts and Erotogenic
Zones,” Freud sketches the fundamental parameters of the drive that will serve as the
basis for future revisions. Our aim here is to cultivate a working understanding of the
drives in relation to the body and erogenous zones so that we may by extension determine
how touch figures into this constellation of ideas. It would be useful to reproduce the
section that pertains explicitly to defining the drive. By the term “drive,” Freud means
the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously
flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a ‘stimulus,’ which
is set up by single excitations coming from without. The concept of
[drive] is thus one of those lying on the frontier between the
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mental and the physical. The simplest and likeliest assumption as to
the nature of [drives] would seem to be that [a drive] is without quality,
and, so far as mental life is concerned, is only to be regarded as a
measure of the demand made upon the mind for work. (168)
The first point that deserves commentary is in fact the last sentence quoted above, which
Freud will later modify in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” to conclude with “in
consequence with its connection to the body” (122). Freud appears hesitant and at times
ambivalent about how to handle the materiality of the body with respect to the drives,
which is to say, the precise nature of the “connection” of the mind to the body. While he
appears quite willing in “Three Essays” to delineate the zones and organs of the body that
are integral to self-preservation, erotogencity, the sexual drives and libido, he will begin
to question the relevance of such precision with respect to psychoanalytic inquiry. While
he insists that parts of the body are undoubtedly the source of the drives, he ultimately
maintains that we can only know the drives by way of their presence in mental life. He
will eventually conclude that “the study of the sources of [drives] lies outside the scope
of psychology” and that “an exact knowledge of the sources of [a drive] is not invariably
necessary for purposes of psychological investigation” (“Instincts” 123). Given that
Freud writes this ten years after the publication of “Three Essays,” these claims may
attempt to amend the earlier inconsistences and uncertainties regarding the qualitative
properties of sexual tension.39 More importantly, his decision to distance psychoanalytic
theory from the immediacy of the body reflects a metapsychological shift in Freud’s
39
It is curious that with respect to sexual excitation, Freud is the least confident in his ability to
pin down its unique characteristics. He maintains that they do have a quantitative component, but depend
upon “some peculiarity” that can only be described as qualitative (“Economic Problem” 160). “Perhaps it is
something rhythmic, the periodical duration of changes, [or] the rising and fallings of the volume of
stimuli,” Freud guesses, but concludes that simply, “we do not know.”
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theorization of the psyche. In other words, what we find in Freud’s later works is less a
concern with trying to understand the body directly and rather a zealous interest in 1)
how the stimulation and sensations of the body find expression in the mind, and 2) how
the psyche manages the representations of these stimulations, sensations, and tensions
according to certain operating guidelines and agencies (such as the principle of constancy
or the ever-watchful and policing ego). In other words, as Monique David-Ménard
summarizes in her critical analysis of hysteria, Freud increasingly favoured
psychoanalysis as a theory where “one could not rely upon the idea of a bodily
sensorimotor system that would be independent of the history of the symbolization of the
desiring body” (66). This observation becomes even more acute once we broach Lacan’s
psychoanalytic theories whereby the body can only be thought through the symbolic
Other, a move which effectively negates the immediate presence of the body in favour of
how it is dissected and represented qua signifiers.
For now we will remain loyal to the Freud of “Three Essays,” who insists that the
drives are endosomatic. By “endosomatic,” Freud means that the drives originate from
within the body and generate tension that from the perspective of the individual cannot be
escaped. This is why Freud contrasts a drive with an external stimulus, the latter of which
can be either avoided or in most cases, efficiently removed (i.e. swatting a fly that has
landed on the surface of the skin). This leads Freud to state, “the source of [a drive] is a
process of excitation occurring in an organ and the immediate aim of the [drive] lies in
the removal of this organic stimulus” (168). This forces Freud to admit that the term
“stimulus” can have internal and external sources. The main difference between them,
however, is that the former is made known to the mind quantitatively (increase and
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decrease in tension) and cannot be eluded, whereas the latter also subsumes qualitative
attributes and can, in most cases, be avoided or dealt with quickly. Furthermore, the idea
of the drive as a border concept not only emphasizes the intermeshing of corporeal flesh
with the psychical apparatus, but also indicates that any conflict arising from meeting the
demands in question would undoubtedly introduce complications into the entire
integrated system. We would also do well to remember that while the above definition is
specifically describing what the drive entails, the title of the subsection should draw our
attention to the components of the drive and their interrelation to the erogenous zones.
Thus, while Freud schematizes the drives as pressures internal to the body, he envisions
the sexual drives, which are always partial, as related to zones of the body that are highly
responsive to stimulation. Crucially, one of Freud’s most profound arguments in “Three
Essays” is that sexual activity exists apart from functions relating to self-preservation and
only happens to coincide with them. Using the example of thumb-sucking as the
prototype for the component drive (in this case, the oral drive), he concludes that infant
sexuality exhibits three characteristics: 1) At its origin it attaches itself to one of the vital
somatic functions; 2) it has as yet no sexual object, and is thus auto-erotic; 3) its sexual
aim is dominated by an erotogenic zone (182-83). Once the infant experiences
satisfaction associated with these zones, it will continue to seek out this enjoyment in a
repetitive fashion (contingent upon the vicissitudes of the drives). The point is that the
internal operation of the body necessarily puts us in physical contact with the external
world, which in turn makes us alert to zones of the body that are susceptible to
stimulation and are experienced as pleasurable. Here, however, Freud encounters a
paradox in his own theory, for if stimulation of an erotogenic zone generates an increase
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in sexual tension, then according to his principle of constancy shouldn’t this tension be
perceived as unpleasure and not pleasure?
Freud attempts to rectify this inconsistency in his paper on “The Economic
Problem of Masochism” (1924), postulating three principles that regulate mental
functioning (160-61). Adopting the suggestion of a “Nirvana-principle,” Freud subsumes
his previous theory of the pleasure-principle under this new designation. The Nirvanaprinciple therefore includes the death drives, which Freud argues follow the logic of the
principle of constancy and “seek to restore to an earlier state of things.” The reformed
pleasure-principle now includes the life-drives and represents the claims of the libido,
therefore opening up the possibility for the pleasurable increase in tension known as
sexual excitement (including pain that is perceived as sexually exciting). Lastly is the
reality-principle, which maintains its objective of postponing the discharge of tension due
to the demands of external reality. All three principles tolerate one another, but not
without necessary conflict or compromise. Freud’s revised schema thus allows for the
stimulation of an erogenous zone that may include both enjoyable sensations (sexual
pleasure or enjoyment) and the underlying increase in tension (unpleasure) that ultimately
aims for discharge. Satisfaction of the sexual drives is therefore more closely related with
this supplementary element of enjoyment, which as Zupancic argues, “[deviates] from the
object and aim of a given demand while pursuing its own goal, thus constituting a
seemingly dysfunctional detour” (18). Satisfaction related to discharging tension does in
certain circumstances continue to coincide with the sexual drives; however, they are more
inclined to gravitate to the demands of the biological body.
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Zupan£i£’s reading of Freud’s “Three Essays” necessarily brings our attention to
a form of satisfaction that tends “to become independent and self-perpetuating in
pursuing and reproducing itself’ (16). This is precisely what Freud means when he writes
that the sexual aim of infants is to reproduce a satisfaction (184). We should be mindful
that Freud says “a repetition of the satisfaction” and not simply, “satisfaction.” Why does
Freud draw our attention to this element of repetition? Repetition, Freud argues, signals a
striving to renew the first experiences of satisfaction, which is to say, to reproduce a
pleasurable experience that has been remembered. Freud later reiterates this point,
stating, “the compulsion to repeat and instinctual satisfaction which is immediately
pleasurable seem to converge here into an intimate partnership” (“Beyond” 23). Once
again, it is difficult to know whether Freud means experiences of sexual
pleasure/enjoyment or the complete exhaustion of tension when he uses the term
“instinctual satisfaction” here. Considering that the demands of external reality intervene
at the beginning of the infant’s life, complete satisfaction prior to the advent of the reality
principle can only become a retroactive phantasy that the subject will (unconsciously)
strive to achieve. Sexual enjoyment, therefore, which is always partial, becomes a bonus
form of enjoyment or pleasure, which is precisely why in “The Ego and the Id” Freud
remarks that the force of libido “introduces disturbances into the process of life” (46-47).
Libido is the excess of energy that is introduced into the economy of mental functioning
and is subject to vicissitudes, whereas original or complete satisfaction relates to a more
fundamental loss that the subject seeks throughout life to rectify. Complicating matters
further, repetition also functions in relation to unpleasurable experiences that contradict
the pleasure principle. “The compulsion to repeat,” Freud argues, “also recalls from the

53

past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long
ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have since been
repressed” (“Beyond” 20). Infantile sexuality, which is comprised of the partial, sexual
drives as outlined above, is “doomed to extinction,” insofar as the demand for satisfaction
(immediate pleasure) is “incompatible with reality” and sexual maturation. Freud argues
that “the efflorescence of infantile sexuality” can only end “in the most distressing
circumstances and to the accompaniment of the most painful feelings.” These
experiences, related to feelings of anger, jealousy, disappointment, scorn, and shame, are
relived through the transference relationship, signaling a compulsion to repeat that rallies
against the pleasure principle. Here, Freud is maneuvering at least two kinds of repetition
simultaneously: one is related to the pleasure or enjoyment associated with the first
experiences of satisfaction, and the other is related to the painful feelings resulting from
having to give up those experiences of satisfaction. In other words, the first experiences
of satisfaction are modified by the prohibitions that restrict enjoyment, which in turn
generate thoughts and feelings that may be subject to repression or other vicissitudes.
Keeping in mind the psychoanalytic perspective that maintains we can only approach the
past from the lens of the present, repetition thus signals the drive to attain satisfaction
prior to the implementation of the law (or prohibition), as well as the return of the
repressed, which is to say, symptoms that arise due to the repression of painful or
conflicting ideas, thoughts and feelings having to do with giving up, coping with, or
mastering forms of (sexual) enjoyment.
♦

At the heart of repetition is conflict. Nowhere is this maxim most perceptible
than in Freud’s revamped drive theory. In “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” Freud
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theorizes the forces of Eros, which include the claims of libido and seeks to bind and
unify, and death, which seeks to unbind, destroy, and ultimately return to an earlier state
of existence. We can already appreciate this distinction according to the examples of
repetition that we concluded with in the previous paragraph. The idea of wanting to
return to a complete state of satisfaction expresses the aim of the death drive, while the
preoccupation with the sexual enjoyment reflects the dimension of libido or Eros. The
distinction, however, does not hold, and Freud spends the rest of his career attempting to
account for the ways in which these “two classes of [drives] are fused, blended, and
alloyed with each other” (“The Ego and the Id” 41). The paradox that emerges reveals the
intimate relationship whereby the forces of death and Eros are derived from each other.
Freud recognizes this paradox, for example, in the oral stage of the organization of libido,
during which time “the act of obtaining erotic mastery over an object coincides with that
object’s destruction” (“Beyond” 54). In this example, the oral drive contains elements of
both the life and death drives, but the tension between the drive and the loved object is
ultimately resolved (figuring the “victory” of the death drive, which paradoxically fulfills
the aim of the Eros). The sadistic element that emerges in this example is found not only
in the fact that the drive destroys the loved object, but that the drive demands more,
encore! encore!, thus revealing the true object of the drive: not the thing that one
consumes, but rather the implicit dimension of satisfaction that revels in its own
prolongation.40

40
This insight is decidedly Freudian in nature, but the dimension of enjoyment is a Lacanian
contribution. In “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” Freud argues that the object is the most variable
component of drive and is not originally connected with it (122). Lacan takes this observation a step
further: the drive is indifferent to its object precisely because every object has the potential to satisfy the
drive. The drive only aims for satisfaction, which in Lacanian terms is related to touching on the dimension
of excess or jouissance as the drive completes its circuit around the object.
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The example of the oral drive showcases two aspects of the component drives that
are important to our discussion: the elements of activity and erotic mastery. The first
aspect has to do with the factor of aggression that Freud believes is inherent in the sexual
drives and is characterized by the production of libido that is “masculine” in nature.41
While the force of the drives is always active, Freud maintains that the sexual aim may be
active or passive. This distinction leads to a curious parallel between the role of the eyes
and the skin in his discussion on perversions. Whereas scopophilia and exhibitionism
(sexual arousal induced by the scopic drive of looking and being looked at) correspond to
the relationship between the eye and the erogenous zones, “the components of the sexual
[drive] which involve pain and cruelty” assume the same role with respect to the skin
(“Three Essays” 169). It strikes us that Freud immediately adopts the polarity of
sadism/masochism with respect to the erogeneity of the skin rather than exploring forms
of touching and being touched that do not involve cruelty or pain. For Freud, however,
the elements of cruelty and pain are not necessarily found at the “extreme” limits of
sexuality, but rather are present in the first impulses in sexual life. We have already
encountered the sadistic component underlying the oral drive, which Freud refers to as
the “canabalistic” stage in infantile sexual development (198). He also addresses the
“sadistic-anal” stage where the activity of the drive is put into service of gaining mastery
over the musculature of the anus, whereas the passive sexual aim has to do with the

41
This requires some further elaboration. By no means subscribing to fixed “masculine” and
“feminine” characteristics, one finds Freud grappling with the age-old question of sexual difference in
“Three Essays” where he takes up the subject of libido under the subsection “The Differentiation Between
Men and Women.” Aside from a rather lengthy footnote added in 1915 that explores the
masculine/feminine binary in relation to activity/passivity, as well as biological and sociological
perspectives, Freud insists that libido is “invariably and necessarily of a masculine nature, whether it occurs
in men or women and irrespectively of whether its object is a man or a woman” (219-20). Again, for Freud,
this emphasizes the active character of libido that is present in both men and women. Strictly speaking from
a psychoanalytic perspective there is no such thing as passive libido.
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pleasurable sensations derived from defecating. The component of sadism, as Laplanche
and Pontalis point out, has to do with the contradictory aims of destroying the object as
well as preserving it, which is represented by the function of the anal sphincter that both
retains and evacuates objects (35-36). Significantly, the aims of destruction and
preservation tell us something not only about the oral and anal drives, but all drives,
which is to say that at some fundamental level, the violence of the drives generates
tension in accordance with the erotic aim of mastery: to preserve and maintain one’s
relation to the object, to perpetuate the endless circling of the object, to maximize one’s
enjoyment of the object, preferably without destroying or obliterating the object.
Unfortunately, this train of thought leads Freud to theorize a relationship between
the so-called primacy of the genital drive and the anthro-historical roots of the sadistic
component. He touches on this in “Three Essays” when he writes that the sexuality of
most male human beings contains an element of aggressiveness or a desire to subjugate,
“the biological significance of [which] seems to lie in the need for overcoming the
resistance of the sexual object by means other than the process of wooing” (157-58).
Freud raises this point again in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” only afterwards to
seemingly detract his argument from this “highly embarrassing situation” (54).
Nevertheless, he maintains the primacy of the genital drive or the “one drive to rule them
all,” which is to say that psychosexual development ultimately leads to the hierarchical
organization of the component drives under the dominance of the genitals.42 This
theoretical claim is prefigured in “Three Essays” when Freud theorizes the dimensions of
“fore-pleasure” and “end-pleasure,” the former of which can be traced back to infantile

42
In Freud’s late paper, “The Infantile Genital Organization” (1923), he shifts the emphasis of
sexual difference from the primacy of the genitals to that of the renowned phallus (142).
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sexuality, whereas the latter only becomes possible with the advent of puberty. Fore
pleasure therefore encompasses sensory excitations (touching, licking, looking, etc.) that
are pleasurable but also partial. Freud argues that end-pleasure ultimately synthesizes
these partial pleasures into the sexual act. The “normal sexual aim” is related to this endpleasure, or what Freud viewed as the concluding discharge of sexual tension in the
genital drive. Lacan, as Dylan Evans argues, rejected Freud’s idea of the complete
organization or fusion of the partial (sexual) drives and consequently his preference for
genital primacy. Crucially, Evans emphasizes Lacan’s argument that the drives are partial
“not in the sense that they are parts of a whole (a ‘genital drive’), but in the sense that
they only represent sexuality partially; they do not represent the reproductive function of
sexuality but only the dimension o f enjoyment’ (47, emphasis added). This Lacanian
insight may call into question Freud’s claim of genital primacy, but it doesn’t clearly
explain how touch figures into the compulsion of the drives or the dimensions of
sexuality and aggression that define Freud’s formulation of the drives in “Beyond the
Pleasure Principle.” Admittedly, Freud’s foray into the tactile universe in “Three Essays”
is often limited to providing examples of infantile sexuality (i.e. thumb-sucking,
childhood wrestling, masturbation, and so forth) rather than expanding on the
significance of touch in relation to the component drives, or for that matter, how forms of
touch manifest as expressions of the drives. In all fairness to Freud, “Three Essays” is not
a proclaimed testament to the role of touch in psychosexual development, but rather a
systematization of sexuality that corresponds to an exploration of the vicissitudes of the
drives. We must, therefore, look elsewhere in order to further develop our analysis of
touch.
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We would like to return, for a moment, to the subject of the life and death drives,
the former of which, if we recall, includes the forces of Eros or the sexual drives and,
according to Freud, are “by far the more conspicuous and accessible to study” (“The Ego
and the Id” 40). In “Economic Problem” Freud advances the hypothesis that libido dilutes
the potency of the destroying drive by diverting its aims outward, toward the external
world by way of the muscular apparatus (163). In turn, “a portion of the [drive] is placed
directly in the service of the sexual function”-the sexual function of which is
constitutively splintered by way of the component drives. The transformed “destroying
drive,” as Freud calls it here, is now called “the destructive [drive], the [drive] for
mastery, or the will to power.” The logic implicit in Freud’s argument necessarily
prefigures Lacan’s maxim that “every drive is.. .a death drive,”43 albeit firmly rooted in a
biological paradigm. At this point, however, we’d like to draw attention to the
relationship between the muscular apparatus (the body) and the outwardly directed drive
for mastery, a relationship which is embodied in the game of fort/da invented by Freud’s
grandson. Not only will reviewing the details of this game bring into focus the aspects of
the drives we have discussed in this chapter (repetition, mastery, aggression), but it will
also allow for us to enter into a dialogue with Lacan whose theories on subjectivity and
desire will add further dimensions to our analysis of the fort/da game.

Fort! ( ) Da! (Part I)
Near the beginning of “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” Freud reflects upon the
significance of children’s play, and in particular, his observations of a small child of
eighteen months who invents a simple game of “fort/da,” or “gone/there,” or in child
43 See Écrits, “Position of the Unconscious” 719.
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parlance, “o-o-o-o/da!” (14-17). Freud gives a detailed account of this particular child,
whom, along with his parents, he had the opportunity to live with for a short while.44 At
the age of eighteen months, the child could pronounce a few comprehensible words, as
well as several audible sounds that could be interpreted by those closest to him. He was
considered a “good boy” who did not disturb his parents at night, who conscientiously
obeyed orders not to touch certain things or go into certain rooms, and most
commendably, did not show signs of distress at his mother’s absence (14). Here it is
significant that Freud’s grandson has already internalized the prohibition not to touch
certain objects, and has accepted the fact that he cannot always have access to his mother.
This last point also deserves praise because, as Freud is apt to conversely highlight, the
little boy was greatly attached and fond of his mother, the sole person who fed and took
care of him. As we move forward, let us be mindful of the discrepancy between the
child’s great attachment for the mother, and his ability to remain calm at the times of her
departure.
Freud then continues his survey of the child, noting “an occasional disturbing
habit” of taking objects and throwing them out of sight and reach, an activity that was
accompanied by a long, drawn out “o-o-o-o,” signifying his fascination of, and libidinal
investment in, the game.45 Freud comes to the conclusion that this sound represents the
German word “fort,” which is translated in English as “gone” (15). The child’s game
evolves to incorporate a second element, which is made possible by way of a small
wooden reel with a string attached to it. Thus, undoubtedly by trial and error, the child

44 The child is in fact Freud’s grandson; an endearing detail that Lacan shares with his audience
during one of his weekly seminars.
45 We use the term “libidinal investment” to reflect both the emotional stakes of the game as well
as the dimension of enjoyment that defines the child’s relationship to the toy.
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learns that not only can he make the object disappear, but much to his joy and surprise he
can also make it reappear, an event that is jubilantly expressed through the German word
“da,” in English meaning, “there.” These are the rules of the game: disappearance and
return. Freud observes that while the first act can be repeated endlessly, far more pleasure
is derived from the return of the absent object. It is worth noting that much of the child’s
investment in the game is dependent upon the visual field. It is the disappearance and
return of the visual image that arouses feelings of disappointment and joy in the child.
With respect to the child’s relationship to his mother, it is also this visual image that
provides an indication of the physical proximity between them, demonstrating how the
visual and haptic fields are intertwined. As the visual image of the mother either
decreases in size and eventually disappears altogether, the child becomes increasingly
aware of the spatial and physical distance between them. Returning to the game, we
should also be mindful of this tactile dimension that is, at first glance, overshadowed by
the emphasis on the visual field. The game involves throwing the reel out o f reach and
then retrieving it. There must then be a pleasure associated with the kinetic release of
letting go of the object as well as its return to the child’s grasp. Aptly, Freud writes in
“Totem and Taboo,” “touching is the first step towards obtaining any sort of control over,
or attempting to make use of, a person or object” (33-34). Therefore, the game is not only
about representing the visual presence and absence of the mother, but also about the child
coming to terms with releasing and retrieving objects in relation to its own body. This
involves not only learning how to manipulate objects via touch, but also a more primal
acceptance of the constitutive gap or space that separates the infant from the other-a gap,
we might add, on which the entire game turns.
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We discover the significance of this gap in the first of several interpretations that
Freud advances. His first interpretation relates to the child’s “great cultural achievement,”
that is to say, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction in relation to the mother or
primary caregiver (“Beyond” 15). Indeed, this is on the one hand, a cultural demand that
all children are required to acknowledge and respond to, while on the other hand, an
achievement insofar as in order to become subjects all children must disavow their
unfettered relationships to the primary person who provides for them. As Richard
Boothby aptly remarks, “entry into civilized life requires renunciation of many sorts of
gratification, prime among them a greater degree of physical intimacy with one another”
(65). Understood in light of this forced sacrifice, the game figures as a form of
compensation, a kind of re-staging or re-enactment of the distressing event of the
mother’s departure that has emotionally impacted the child. The repetition of the first
stage of the game, which demands that the child must delay gratification, is required in
order to bring about the pleasurable second stage, the triumphant return. Still, Freud is
troubled by the fact that his grandson more frequently carries out only the first stage of
the game than the game in its entirety.
This leads Freud to a second interpretation, one that accounts for the fact that,
during the primal separation,46 the child can only passively experience the fallout from
the overwhelming absence of the mother. In turn, the game provides the child with a
means of taking an active role in reproducing the original traumatic event that he could
only passively experience. In this instance, the child projects himself onto the toy as he

46
This is our term that we have inferred from Freud’s description of how the child copes with
separation. By “primal separation” we mean the first emotionally charged event that is remembered by the
infant whereby the parent is recognized as a symbolic other and is significantly missing or absent.
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attempts to conceptualize the difficult ideas of presence and absence that have been
applied to his relationship with his mother. As Freud gestures toward and Lacan will
more fully address, the game, which attempts to give symbolic representation to a missed
encounter, signifies the child’s attempt to master or make sense of the rupture that was
introduced into his seemingly perfect existence with his mother. This second
interpretation also gestures toward how children’s play and phantasies are a means of
unconscious expression, insofar as these activities reflect an attempt at overcoming
primal separation, which can only be represented by the nonsensical master signifier that
founds repression.47
In spite of these two accounts, Freud presses onward, not completely satisfied
with his initial interpretations of the game. His third interpretation accounts for the
element of aggression in the game. Observing that aggression is directed towards the toy,
Freud then postulates that it can represent either the mother or the father. In this first
situation, the child exacts his revenge on his mother for abandoning him, the roots of
which have likely been repressed and only find expression through the aggressive
component of the game whereby he casts the object into exile. He also speculates, based
on a later observation, that the toy could also represent the child’s father. This makes
sense insofar as the child imagines that the father is the object that the mother desires; he
is the reason that she abandoned him. In turn, this would give further evidence as to why
the child would only want to enact the first half of the game: in phantasy, the absence of

47
The Lacanian notion of a master signifier, represented by the symbol “Si,” founds the nucleus of
the unconscious by virtue of standing in for the “first” signifier that subsequently introduces the question
that will haunt the subject: “What does the Other want (from me)?”

63

the father means that the child can once again be re-united with the mother.48 However, it
must be pointed out that according to this slightly sadistic version of the game, the rules
are slightly reversed: the child can only take pleasure in wishing away the father by the
painful reminder that he must be present before he can once again be banished. The yield
of pleasure thus takes a twisted turn.
Ultimately, Freud is inconclusive as to the “correct” interpretation of his
grandson’s game of fort/da, which only indicates that child’s play can and does take on
multiple significations, especially once the unconscious is taken into account.
Significantly, the repetitious nature of the game indicates a fundamental workingthrough, not unlike the transference situation that many individuals find themselves in
during analysis. At the same time, the game figures as the primeval marriage between
drive and symbol, a marriage that like any relationship, generates the most passionate
emotions-in this case, within the subject of the drives. This is precisely why the concept
of the drives involves both the erogenous parts of the body and also the symbolic
importance assigned to those body parts. Once understood from the perspective of the
symbolic, the vicissitudes of the drives are understood not only according to the technical
operations that they undergo (repression, sublimation, inhibition, and so forth), but also
according to the laws of language that govern these operations. The register of enjoyment
also shifts here: the drives aren’t concerned with only physiological satisfaction, but also

48
We find a more developed account of this desire in the case study of Little Hans. Stricken by an
unusual phobia of horses, Little Hans’s hysteria-anxiety germinates as a result of a complex series of
events, prime among them having to give up his intimate relationship with his mother, whom he would
often sleep next to in his parents’ bed. The fear that a horse would bite him in the street was, as a result of
partial repression, a disguised fear that Hans’s father would punish him for wishing him dead (fort!) so that
he could again enjoy the satisfaction of his mother’s caresses. As Freud points out, Hans’s anxiety inhibits
him from going out into the street where he might encounter the object that he fears (horse), thus allowing
him to stay at home with his mother. For a more detailed account of the case study, see the chapter on Little
Hans in “Analysis of a Phobia” (1909).
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the enjoyment experienced at the level of the signifier (as the jubilant expression “da!”
indicates). The child’s use of the word “da” not only signifies the presence of the object
and the satisfaction of its return, but also the element of mastery that we touched on
earlier. After all, it is Freud’s grandson who learns that he is capable of throwing and
retrieving the object, that he exercises control over the object’s fate. The drama of the
game, however, hinges on the fact that the child has accepted that he cannot be the thing
that his mother desires-this involves both a symbolic logic as well as an intimate loss.
Physical forms of intimacy are therefore the means of trying to overcome this loss or
conversely, for certain individuals, the means of ignoring or trying to erase the reminder
of that loss (or, touch may be the painful reminder of that loss, in which case contact
would be avoided). That said, it is never the direct confrontation with that loss, but rather
the complex chain of associations that are constructed to shelter oneself from the
overwhelming jouissance of that missed encounter. This “missed encounter” will inform
our Lacanian analysis of touch in Chapter Three, but first we would like to briefly
consider several helpful observations made by Anzieu that will supplement our reading of
the fort/da game.

Anzieu and the Double Prohibition
In his chapter on the prohibitions of touch, Anzieu argues that there are two
rudimentary forms of touch that structure tactile experience. The first form of touch
involves an embrace and is what we take to be a primal form of touch for the infant
insofar as during the first years of life the infant spends much of her time physically close
to the body of her caretaker. Anzieu observes that this experience involves “contact
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through physical embrace, involving a large part of the skin and including pressure,
warmth or coldness, well-being or pain, muscular and vestibulary sensations, [and] a
contact which implies the phantasy of a common skin” (147). This form of physical
contact is prevalent during feeding, social activity, and at times when the parent provides
comfort to the infant when it is distressed. The second tactile experience involves
touching with the hand. This form of contact may be experienced early on, but it is taken
up more intently later in the infant’s development, once it “masters the gestures of
pointing and grasping at objects.” Further, as Anzieu notes, the first form of contact,
which is to say skin-to-skin bodily touching, is later limited only to demonstrations of
affection or muscular strength, both of which must be regulated according to social and
cultural norms. Based on these two forms of tactile experience, he argues that both are
implicated in a double prohibition of touch-a double-threat that is in fact the prerequisite
to the Oedipal prohibition. Here, Anzieu is reading Freud to the letter: you will not sleep
with your mother and you will not kill your father. Both actions involve touching in an
intimate or violent way. Undoubtedly Freud himself is thinking of the Oedipal complex
when he writes that touching and physical contact are
the immediate aim of the aggressive as well as the loving object-cathexis.
Eros desires contact because it strives to make the ego and the loved
object one, to abolish all spatial barriers between them. But
destructiveness, too, which. . . could only take effect at close quarters,
must presuppose physical contact, a coming to grips. (“Inhibitions” 122)
Attuned to the physical implications at work here, Anzieu states that the first form of
tactile experience comes to be judged as “too infantile, or too erogenous or animalistic”
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and thus must be subject to prohibition in order to prevent a “conjoining and confusing of
bodies” (147). We should also consider this prohibition in conjunction with Freud’s
emphasis on the child’s “great cultural achievement,” which is to say that both the child
and his primary caretaker are forced to renounce their physically intimate bonds with
each other. Prolonging these relations not only prompts cultural disapproval, enforced by
the incest taboo, but also forecloses the possibility of becoming a desiring subject.49 In
addition, one learns to limit or completely avoid touching one’s genitals or erogenous
zones, including the genitals and erogenous zones of others. One is also prohibited
against touching persons or objects in a violent way; touch is limited to “the operative
necessities of adaptation to the external world and the pleasures it procures being lasting
only if they are subordinated to the reality principle” (147-48). Both prohibitions aim to
restrict the sexual and aggressive aspects of the drives that Freud theorizes in “Three
Essays” and which are later subsumed in the life and death drives.
Anzieu’s remarks pertaining to the pre-Oedipal requirements of curbing the drives
to touch and be held clearly build upon the fundamental Freudian insight of the
relationship between physical contact and the component drives. The specificity,
however, of his observations bring into focus the particular ways in which the drives to
touch find expression and begin to gamer significance. Prohibition operates here not only
as the explicit ban on certain expressions or objects of touch, but also as the regulatory
function implicit in the service of language. The exchange of signifiers effectively zones
and cuts up the seemingly intact domain that the infant explores through the tactile field,
irrevocably altering the potency of touch and its relationship to the symbol. In other

49
In the next chapter we discuss how Lacan takes up subjectivity and desire, which are
irrevocably linked.
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words, the drives are relegated and tamed through their mediation in the symbolic realm
of language and by fulfilling the demands of the Other. In this case, it is the parent who
stands in for the Other, regulating and dictating the terms of the infant’s tactile
engagement with his environment and body. These demands necessarily restrict the
infant’s impulses to touch, and at a certain level, this involves barring enjoyment. Here,
enjoyment does not necessarily signify straight-up pleasure, but rather indicates
something excessive that does not necessarily guarantee the child’s safety or well-being.
Prohibition on touching, Anzieu observes, “puts the child on his guard against an excess
of excitation and its consequence, the unleashing of the drive” (145). Here we should
read Anzieu with Lacan who, as Evans points out, insists that an excessive quantity of
excitation is closely related to the complex concept of jouissance (148). Thus, as Evans
clarifies, “the pleasure principle is.. .seen as a symbolic law, a commandment which can
be phrased ‘Enjoy as little as possible’.” Indeed, Lacan’s reading of the pleasure principle
is particularly timely at this juncture, the function of which he claims is to “lead the
subject from signifier to signifier, by generating as many signifiers as are required to
maintain at as low a level as possible the tension that regulates the whole functioning of
the psychic apparatus” (Seminar V II119). The effects of the signifier extend beyond
regulating the mental apparatus, an example of which can be drawn from Anzieu’s own
attempt at delineating a haptic drive.
Building from Freudian drive theory, Anzieu hypothesizes an attachment or
clinging drive that “is directed towards the constitution of the skin as a containing and
passively receptive surface” (12). Implicated in this drive, Anzieu notes, is Freud’s idea
of a drive for mastery: “To the extent that the drive is anaclitically supported upon the
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musculature-and particularly by the activity of the hand-it seems to me that it has to be
understood as supplementing the attachment drive.” How exactly does Anzieu envision
this drive for mastery within his own paradigm? “The second prohibition on touching
applies to the drive for mastery,” Anzieu writes, referencing the exploration of touch by
the hand (148). He continues, stating that the infant must learn that “not everything can
be touched, grasped, or mastered.” Here, Anzieu can be interpreted in at least two ways.
The first interpretation is the one developed by Anzieu, whereby the infant learns through
verbal interdictions or signifying gestures that it is not allowed to touch everything it
wants to. He writes, “one does not take, one asks first and one must accept the risk of a
refusal or delay,” which implies the acquisition of language and learning to mediate the
external world by way of the symbol in conjunction with meeting the demands of the
reality principle. This requires that the infant may no longer point or gesture at objects of
interest, but rather must refer to them by name (149). This is precisely what we find in
the fort/da game. Implicit in this game of throwing and retrieving the wooden spool is the
revelation that the experience of touch opens out upon the field of the Other and therefore
becomes caught in the sliding o f the signifier. More precisely—and this begins to develop
the second interpretation of Anzieu’s adoption of the drive for mastery-not everything
can be grasped or touched because the drive to touch intersects with the axis of desire. A
visceral example can be elaborated from Lacan’s maxim “in you more than you,”50
whereby a passionate lover tears into his partner, prying apart his ribcage, ripping out his
internal organs, and shoving aside his spine, only to emerge on the other side to discover
that he did not find that special “je ne sais quo/” that made his partner desirable in the

50
In Seminar X I Lacan writes “/ love you, because inexplicably I love in you something more than
you —the objet petit a —I mutilate you” (263).
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first place. The physical brutality of this hyperbolic illustration demonstrates the
paradoxical nature of desire. The desire to touch and be touched is always a tricky affair
because, quite literally, we can’t quite put our finger on what it is that arouses our desire.
Energized by a certain quality that resists symbolization, as well as the psychical tension
that anticipates the moment of contact with the other, desire propels the subject to search
for this elusive “thing,” whether it involves a particular way that one is touched, or a
particular feeling that is associated with a remembered physical encounter. Desire,
however, sustains itself precisely in remaining unsatisfied, a complexity that we will
unpack in the next chapter, which is centered on exploring the relevance of touch in
Lacanian psychoanalysis.
♦

As this chapter has attempted to shed light on Freud’s conception of the drives,
and how they manifest in various forms, we now find ourselves shifting gears from the
repetition of the drives to the field of desire. In many ways, “drive” and “desire” are two
sides of the same coin-or, at the very least, both are preoccupied or engaged with the
effects of language. The visceral example just given gestures toward not only the
daunting task of thinking about how the field of touch intersects with the field o f the
Other, but also shores up questions relating to how touch signifies, fa ils to signify, or
resists signification altogether. It would appear that in the experience of touching the
other something is missed or falls short. Indeed, as our interactions with significant
friends, family, and lovers attest to, touch is both a means of affection and
communication-yet we must repeatedly come into contact with these individuals in order
to continually relay and receive sentiments. Something doesn’t quite stick. We come
apart only to come back together, repeatedly, attempting to collide into each other and
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always, in some way, missing each other. To frame the problem slightly differently then,
if uninterrupted touching provided us with everything we needed, we would never let go,
as we are often tempted to do. But we do. And we must. Thus, the experience of touch
leaves something behind, or possibly in-between, to be desired. Touch therefore is
perhaps the most emotionally significant while simultaneously the most disjointed facet
of human inter-subjective experience. Touch, as we will see in the next chapter, is always
a missed encounter.
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Chapter Three

“A palpable void lies at the heart of language, being, and body.” Ellie Ragland, Essays on the Pleasures o f Death

Missed Encounters
Jacques Lacan, in his eleventh seminar, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f
Psychoanalysis, also draws our attention to a missed encounter, which he insists is central
for the praxis o f psychoanalysis. Lacan tells us that at the heart of this experience we find
the kernel of the real; an appointment to which we are always called, yet can never quite
arrive on time (53). He also calls this encounter “the tuche.” Significantly, during one of
his weekly seminars (“Tuche and Automaton”), Lacan develops the main idea implicit in
this missed encounter by revisiting the game of fort/da, which we also discussed in the
last chapter. This game, as we learned, is of particular interest because it exemplifies one
of the first instances that the child learns to mediate the world through the symbol (the
signifiers fort/da). The game gestures toward the introduction of a constitutive gap
between infant and mother that engenders the very possibility of touch, as well as the
psychical effort that is necessary to cope with and manage that gap. Thus, if Lacan writes
that he is “trying to grasp how the tuche is represented in visual apprehension” (77), then
we are interested in thinking through the problem of how the tuche is apprehended in the
haptic field, or the field of touch. Central to this investigation will be a closer
examination of Lacan’s concept of objetpetit a, otherwise known in English as object a
or the object-cause of desire, which he discusses in conjunction with the fort/da game.
However, in order to broach Lacan’s discussion of the fort/da game and the implications
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of object a, it will be necessary to guide the reader through his theory of subjectivity,
which is linked to the concepts of the tuche and the automaton. The first section of this
chapter will therefore elucidate key aspects of Lacan’s complex, structural theories so
that we may cautiously approach the horizon o f the Other’s desire through the field of
touch.
Staging this encounter, however, will be a highly precarious affair, one that will
require an excursion through “Lacan’s imaginary.” Problematically, Lacan chooses to
develop his theory of what he calls “the imaginary” according to a dominantly visual
model. Thus, we discover Lacan’s own “missed encounter” with theorizing the
significance of touch, a blunder that is epitomized in Seminar X I by a brief effort to
extend the imaginary beyond the field of vision. We are referring to the passage where
Lacan, explaining to his audience the significance of geometral space through the use of a
triangular schema,51 insists that “such optics are within the grasp of the blind” (92). He
suggests,
We would teach [them] to distinguish, by the sense of touch in [their]
finger-ends, on a surface, a certain configuration that reproduces the
mapping of images - in the same way that we imagine, in pure optics, the
variously proportioned and fundamentally homological relations, the
correspondences from one point to another in space, which always, in the
end, amounts to situating two points on a single thread. (93)
What Lacan is suggesting here is that a blind person is capable of comprehending the
spatial relations that comprise the visual field through skin-sensory perception, which is

51
The triangular schema that Lacan refers to is used to illustrate the lines o f light that comprise,
what he calls, the geometral space o f vision (91).
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not quite the same thing, obviously, as having the privilege of experiencing the visual
field through the capacity of sight. Lacan, recognizing this discrepancy, concludes by
stating, “this construction does not, therefore, particularly enable us to apprehend what is
provided by light.” Unfortunately for our purposes, it does not tell us much about what is
apprehended by the experience of touch, either.
Lacan’s reluctance to explore the faculty of touch according to his three registers
of otherness (symbolic, imaginary, real) is an unfortunate misstep, particularly given his
willingness to consult such an expansive range of other subjects, including philosophy,
literature, mathematics, optics and art. And yet, surprisingly-insofar as he mentions it at
all-Lacan recognizes that physical touch functions according to a significantly different
mode of perception: “For [the blind man] it is a question of apprehending a temporal
function, instantaneity” (87). In other words, as Nicola Diamond cautiously distinguishes,
physical touch involves an immediacy that operates differently than the spatial relations
of distance in the visual field (82). This feature of touch, of which there are many,52
significantly problematizes Lacan’s theorization of the imaginary. His emphasis on the
constitutive role of the imaginary, which crystalizes the ego through what he calls the
“mirror stage,” fails to explain how the immediacy of touch is integral to shaping the
psychical contours of the bodily-ego. One possible way out of this impasse is Didier
Anzieu’s innovative idea of a “skin ego,” which he defines as “a mental image of which
the Ego of the child makes use during the early phases of its development to represent

52
For instance, touch involves a complex model that depends upon different parts of the body (and
their assigned meanings), qualitative attributes used to describe different forms of bodily contact as well as
tactile objects, and a range of intensities involving both pleasure and pain. While these features
purposefully draw attention to the symbolic dimension of touch, they are just as equally committed to
impressing upon the subject a different kind of image, a sensation-image that is remembered and
catalogued according to their symbolic assignment.
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itself as an Ego containing psychical contents, on the basis of its experience of the surface
of the body” (40). While Anzieu’s theory of a skin ego is a natural progression of Freud’s
argument in “The Ego and the Id” that the ego is a projection of a bodily surface, the
transition into Lacanian theory proves more difficult. Still, Anzieu’s idea of a skin ego
fills in an apparent void in Lacan’s theory of the imaginary. His thoughtful examination
of the way in which touch is operative in structuring the ego reflects a compelling and
intellectually stimulating venture, even if it displays little interest in building upon
Lacanian ground.5354 Considering our efforts to explore how touch might be understood
from a Lacanian position, part of this chapter will examine the relationship between the
mirror stage and touch and the complications that ensue, a theoretical quandary that
Anzieu appears resistant to address in his own work.55

53 Freud’s argument concerning the body-ego can be summarized according to several passages in
“The Ego and the Id” where he comes to the realization that a person’s own body and perceptions of
internal and external stimulation contribute to the differentiation between the ego and the id. Indicating that
(physical) touch is integral to this process, Freud is thus lead to conclude, ‘T he ego is first and foremost a
bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface” (26).
54 Anzieu states in The Skin Ego that he is aware of the internal conflict within psychoanalytic
circles between
an empiricist, pragmatic, psychogenetic orientation... in which the psychical organization
is seen as resulting from unconscious childhood experiences (particularly objectrelations), and a structuralist orientation (dominant in France in recent decades) which
denies that the structure is a product of experience, affirming on the contrary that there is
no experience that is not organized by a pre-existent structure. (4)
In response to this conflict Anzieu states that he refuses to takes sides, stating that he finds elements from
both schools of thought useful for thinking the concept of the skin ego. Evidently, Anzieu does rely heavily
upon Freud’s structural model (id/ego/superego) in order to advance his own ideas on the significance of
the skin.
55
Didier Anzieu and his mother, Aimée, have significant connections to Lacan. Anzieu’s mother,
who was a patient of Lacan’s, was in fact the subject of his thesis dissertation. Lacan “borrowed” an
unpublished manuscript that was written by Aimée - a novel based on autobiographical events that
cumulate in the vicious attack of a famous actress - and based his thesis, in part, on an analysis of this text.
Years later, Anzieu underwent analysis with Lacan in order to become an analyst, neither man knowing at
first o f the common link they shared. Anzieu eventually pieced together this connection through
conversations with his mother about her experiences while receiving psychiatric care. Lacan on the other
hand claimed that he did not initially realize that Anzieu was Aimée’s son, but rather learned of this
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Shifting from our analysis of the Lacanian imaginary, to an exploration of how
touch might be integrated into a Lacanian framework, our intent is to move into a
discussion of how touch has the potential to operate as the cause of desire. Central to this
aim will be to show how the signifying force of touch is reliant upon, as Diamond argues,
“a play o f absence in presence” (88). In other words, is the object-cause of desire the
particular way that one touches or is touched, or more radically, the absence that
engenders the possibility of touch, which in turn sustains our desire? We will briefly
consider how Lacan takes up the concept of the gaze in order to explore how desire in the
haptic field is driven by an otherness that constantly eludes our grasp.

Regulating the Real: The Tuch£ and the Automaton
If the most significant discovery for Freud was the discovery of the unconscious,
then Lacan will approach this discovery from the angle of an essential encounter, which
he tells us is “an appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us”
(Seminar X I 53). This isn’t to suggest that the unconscious is the real, rather, the register

relation through Anzieu’s analysis. In her extensive historical account of Lacanian psychoanalysis,
Elisabeth Roudinesco finds Lacan’s alibi unlikely and advances the intriguing hypothesis that Anzieu’s
presence confronted him with his own repressions regarding positive countertransference feelings toward
Aimée (121). Nevertheless, Anzieu’s analysis with Lacan ran from 1949 until 1953, although he alleges
that only the first two years the most productive. After that point, Anzieu bitterly recalls the noticeably
shorter span of each session, as well as Lacan’s explicit injunction not to tell anyone about the shortened0
sessions. Lacan also insisted that Anzieu attend his lectures, even though the latter felt conflicted about
mixing instruction and therapy. Lacan even requested Anzieu’s own notes so that he could publish them - a
curious repetition that mirrors his earlier acquisition of Aimée’s writings. Anzieu’s reception of Lacan’s
own theories is decidedly mixed. Roudinesco, who corresponded with Anzieu, reports that he strongly
objected to Lacan’s position for its excessive systemization, which amounted to identifying “language with
the entirety o f the psychoanalytic domain and the totality of human praxis” (266). However, in other
respects, Anzieu was impressed with Lacan’s ideas, particularly in regards to the analyst’s role in therapy
(267). Anzieu’s resistance to Lacan’s “excessive systemization” is most likely the reason why he shows
little interest in developing his ideas within a Lacanian paradigm. Curiously, both Anzieu and Lacan appear
resistant to developing the implications o f each other’s theoretical contributions in their respective works.
For a more detailed account of both Aimée and Didier Anzieu’s interactions with Lacan, see Roudinesco,
Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History o f Psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985 112-17,120-21, 232-33,266-67.
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of the real allows us to think through the concept of the unconscious and its relationship
to repetition and the concept of object a.
Since, as it turns out, Lacan cannot tell us exactly what the real is, he instead asks,
“where do we meet this real?” (53). Central to Lacan’s understanding of the real is that
we cannot directly experience it, but rather only as a limit to the symbolic, or what Lacan
refers to as the order of language and representation (also known as the big ‘O’ Other).
As Tim Dean explains, the real is “the logical limit internal to symbolization” that while
inherently negative, nevertheless represents “the impossibility against which
symbolization is constantly being elaborated” (51). Therefore, the real must be negotiated
through the mediation of the symbolic and imaginary orders in order for an individual to
accede to a subject position and claim an identity. Lacan represents these three “orders”
(real, symbolic, imaginary) in the pictorial representation of three overlapping rings,
otherwise known as the borromean knot. Significantly, the diagram of the borromean
knot is originally introduced by Lacan in Seminar X X in relation to the object a.56
Represented by the center space where all the three rings overlap, this little a has a rather
big role to play in sustaining desire.57 We will return to the concept of object a
throughout this chapter. It is first necessary, however, to define the relationship between
the tuche and the automaton in order to understand the nature of repetition and the role of
the signifier in founding the (split) subject. In providing an outline of Lacan’s theory on
56 Lacan begins exploring the complex relationship between the borromean knot, mathematic
formalization, topology, and object a in his twentieth seminar {Seminar XX). It is not until his twentysecond seminar that he assigns the real, symbolic, and imaginary orders to each of the rings of the
borromean knot {Seminar XXII, R.S.I. is currently not available in English).
57 Alain Sheridan offers some clarifying remarks in regards to the “a” in question. While he points
out that a stands for autre (or “other”), the qualifying descriptor "p e tit’ (small) distinguishes this otherness
from the big Other, or the symbolic Other {Seminar X I 282). Furthermore, Lacan also makes reference to a
third other (lowercase ‘o’) that designates imaginary otherness. In other words, Lacan’s accounts for
otherness according to his three orders: symbolic {Autre), imaginary {autre), and real {objetpetit a).
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subjectivity, we will then be in the position to return to the fort/da game and begin
exploring the relationship between touch and the object-cause of desire.
Lacan takes up the question of the real, or the “missed encounter,” in relation to
two inter-related concepts that have ties to Freud’s work in “Beyond the Pleasure
Principle”: the tuche and the automaton. Lacan defines both of these concepts and their
relationship in a passage that is worth reiterating here:
First, the tuche, which we have borrowed, as I told you last time, from
Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the
encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the
coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves
governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which lies behind the
automaton, and it is quite obvious, throughout Freud’s research, that it is
this that is the object of his concern. (53-54)
Right away we can see Lacan folding in Freudian terminology. On the one hand, we have
the automaton, or network of signifiers, which Lacan aligns with the pleasure principle or
the primary process. As we learned at the end o f Chapter Two, Lacan equates the
pleasure principle with the (unconscious) production of signifiers that bind the tension
involved in mental functioning. On the other hand, the tuche, or the encounter with the
real, lies beyond and behind the automaton. Thus, Lacan appears to be arguing for not
only a dimension of the real that lies beyond the functioning of the network of signifiers,
but also a missed encounter that lies behind the signifier, or more specifically, behind the
analysand’s speech. In other words, the analysand comes to analysis because some
unknown component of his life history has not yet been symbolized, which in turn creates
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a kind of knot or block in understanding. Words spill from his mouth, but they
consistently miss the mark. Still, he persists in speaking about his symptom(s) in order to
try and get at the heart of the matter.58 Thus, like the White Rabbit, who upon crossing
paths with Alice exclaims, “Oh dear, oh dear, I shall be too late!” (2), the analysand is
always already late for an appointment that nevertheless calls to him-an address to which
he must urgently respond.
Now, before we investigate into how the tuche relates to repetition, it is necessary
to develop a few points that Lacan makes about the automaton or the “network of
signifiers” (52), particularly how this network of signifiers makes possible the emergence
o f the Lacanian notion o f the subject. In Seminar XI, Lacan stresses that there are certain
fundamental relations that pave the way for later, more complex, inter-subjective
relations. These essential relations, Lacan argues, are taken from “whatever nature may
offer as supports, supports that are arranged in themes of opposition. Nature provides . . .
signifiers, and these signifiers organize human relations in a creative way, providing
structures and shaping them” (20). For now, let us take note and remember Lacan’s
observation that signifiers are arranged in themes of opposition or difference. More
pertinent to our present discussion is how the signifier comes to bear on the subject, or
more appropriately, allows us to posit any subject at all.
According to Lacan there is no subject per se prior to language. Insofar as the
subject can only express itself in language, the latter is constitutive of the former. As
Bruce Fink argues, the subject is thus “barred by language, as alienated within the Other”
(The Lacanian Subject 41). This Other is the locus of language, or, as Joan Copjec puts it,
that which guarantees our consistency as symbolic subjects (Read M y Desire 41). In
58 Or, recast more appropriately, the analysand tries to get at the void of the matter.
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Lacan’s own words: “The subject is bom in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of
the Other. But, in this very fact, this subject-which, was previously nothing if not a
subject coming into being-solidifies into a signifier” (Seminar X I 199). Lacan’s argument
not only maintains that the signifier stands in for the subject-a subject that is
paradoxically only possible with the advent o f the signifier-but it also implies that the
speaking subject does not have complete mastery over the meanings produced by what
s/he says. Indeed language, or the chain o f signifiers, is never “ours” to begin with, which
is why Lacan aligns discourse/language/meaning on the side of the Other.59 In other
words, rather than being subjects who freely express themselves in language, we are in a
sense constrained from the beginning, faced with a forced choice to accede to a symbolic
position that requires that we demand need through the signifier, which in turn produces a
leftover: desire.60 Desire, for Lacan, is not the desire for this or that, but more
specifically, related to what he refers to as “the effect of language,” which introduces
cause into a subject (“Position of the Unconscious” 708). Lacan further develops this
argument in Seminar X I where he asserts that he is in a position to “introduce into the
domain of cause the law of the signifier, in the locus of which the gap is produced” (23).
This “gap” will continue to be a theoretical problem for us to work through. However, at
this particular juncture, we want to finally draw attention to another of Lacan’s renowned
59 Lacan’s use of the concept “signifier” is borrowed from Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure.
Unlike Saussure, however, who insisted that language is comprised of a differential system of signs
(signifier/signified), Lacan emphasizes the primacy of the signifier. While for Lacan psychoanalysis works
primarily through the phonological manifestations o f the signifier (units of speech), the structural logic of
the signifier relies upon difference to inscribe meaning. Meaning therefore is never fixed and is dependent
upon the position of the signifier in relation to other signifiers within a system. In other words, there is no
guaranteed signified (meaning), only the play of the signifier that perpetually elaborates what we interpret
as meaning or truth.
60 Thus Lacan’s renowned equation: “This is why desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor
the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the
phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung)” (“Signification of the Phallus” 580).
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sayings: “the subject is what the signifier represents, and the latter cannot represent
anything except to another signifier” (“Position of the Unconscious” 708). What Lacan
means is that the subject is missing from the chain of signifiers and that the process of
signification can only ever retroactively posit the subject.6162For Lacan, there is no
signifier that refers directly to the subject. The logic implicit in the sliding of the signifier
(Si

S2) both engenders and subjugates the split subject ($ ), the implications of which

we will return in our discussion of the fort/da game.
Thus far, we have attempted to outline how the network of signifiers engenders
the (split) subject, and more specifically, how the subject is represented by a signifier,
which in turn can only derive meaning in relation to another signifier. This is why, in
Seminar XI, Lacan says that “the characteristic of the subject of the unconscious is that of
being, beneath the signifier that develops its networks, its chains and its history, at an
indeterminate place” (208). By way of our detour, we have arrived back at the enigma of
what exactly lies behind the signifier, or in this instance, beneath the signifier. Beyond,
behind, beneath. Amidst the well-oiled machinery of the automaton, something is awry.
“Impediment, failure, split,” Lacan says, “In a spoken or written sentence something
stumbles” (25). Let us now try to address this “something” that psychoanalysis takes as
its primary concern.

61 In Seminar VII Lacan explicitly makes this point: “the subject is literally at his beginning the
elision o f a signifier as such, the missing signifier in the chain” (224).
62 Lacan’s master discourse utilizes these symbols, in addition to the object a, to describe the
process of attaining subjectivity: - j “ ■The objet petit a falls away as the necessary Thing that we give up
in order to be able to persist in language, to “be” subjects that are paradoxically lacking (in being). We will
explain this idea more fully when we return to the fort/da game in order to demonstrate what is at stake for
Lacan in the process of subjectification.

81

Returning to our discussion of the tuche, we find Lacan trying to account for how
our missed encounter with the real makes its presence felt in analysis through repetition.
He tells us that repetition is related to the “return of signs” and that it is always veiled in
analysis (54). He uses a familiar example to make this point, that of the analysand who is
late for his or her session, or misses the session altogether.63 He warns that the
analysand’s speech should not be taken at face value, but simultaneously acknowledges
that analysis depends upon “this obstacle, this hitch” (54). He then maneuvers a sudden
swerve, drawing our attention to the function of the tuche, which he aligns with a
phenomenon that psychoanalysis is well acquainted with, that of trauma. Trauma, Lacan
claims, is the key to understanding the entire conflict between the pleasure principle and
the reality principle. In his essay, “The Real Cause of Repetition,” Fink reminds us that
what is involved in the pleasure principle (for Lacan) is the automaton, which he says
corresponds with the “the automatic, lawlike, regulated stringing together of the subject’s
signifiers in the unconscious” (215).64 The reality principle, however, has nothing to do
with the Lacanian real, and has more to do with exerting control at the level of conscious
thought (Seminar V II33). This intervention, made on behalf of the ego, reconstructs our
perceptions of reality, perceptions that are inevitably shaded by the symbolic order or the
pleasure principle. Where then, does conflict emerge? Lacan provides us with an answer:

63 The example o f showing up late or missing a session is usually treated by analysts as a sign or
symptom on behalf of the analysand that needs to be addressed in analysis. It may indicate, for example, an
unconscious desire to avoid talking about a particular issue that was to be taken up in that week’s session,
or an attempt to provoke or elicit a response from the analyst. The analysand may spin all kinds of stories
about why she was late or could not make the session. The analyst understands this web-of-signifiers as
only an extension of the transference-relationship and therefore it must be interpreted as resistance in
relation to the work o f analysis.
64 Subsequent citations by this author will refer only to his this text and will be noted by the
corresponding page numbers in parenthesis.
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“the reality system, however far it is developed, leaves an essential part of what belongs
to the real a prisoner in the toils of the pleasure principle” (55). To understand what
Lacan means here, it is useful to turn to Zupanòic’s interpretation of the Lacanian
unconscious. She argues, “The problem-and this is precisely what is called unconsciousis that the supposed straight line of (true or false) representation is constitutively
fractured, thrown ‘out of joint’: while the distortions use fragments of reality, they
correspond to (and are driven by) the inherent void, or gaps, of this reality” (26). These
voids or gaps gesture toward fragments of the real that lack representation, and that, to
use a cliché, “throw a wrench in the works.” The crucial psychoanalytic insight is thus
not to unravel the structure of representation so that we may discover the “real” reality,
and in turn work out the kinks that the unconscious bears witness to, but to recognize the
full force of the tuché or the missed encounter with the real that wakes us from our
slumber and engenders a flood of imagery and meaning to plug up the hole in the
symbolic Other. In other words, the real must be thought of as a failure of the system of
signification itself, a productive failure that the automaton simultaneously instigates as
well as tries to account for.
♦

Implicit in the relationship between the tuché and the automaton is the question of
how the real engenders representation and more precisely, the generative gap inherent in
the signifying process. Attuned to this technicality, Lacan calls our attention to a complex
term, Vorstellungsreprasentanz, which he defines as “that which takes the place of
representation” (60).65 Offering clarification by way of breaking this complex term into

65
Later, Lacan insists that Vorstellungsreprasentanz should be translated as “representative of the
representation” and not, as others have suggested, “the representative representative” (217).
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two parts, Fink writes that the Vorstellung is aligned with “a real presence of image
which can never be rendered in words,” while Repräsentanz is more closely aligned with
symbolic representation or the play of signifiers (227). Here, it might be useful to think of
Freud’s primal infant who, as he discusses in The Interpretation o f Dreams, attempts to
“restore the situation of first satisfaction” (565-66). At the core of this satisfactory
experience is the accompaniment of a certain perception that will forever become
associated with the memory-trace of arousal of the need. Freud calls this psychical
activity “identity o f perception,” which he argues aims “at repeating the perception
associated with satisfaction of need.” What does this tell us about Vorstellung'? We
believe that it refers to the perception of a carnal experience that cannot ever be presented
in the same way again. This experience, likely related to the perception of an image,
sound, or sensation, emotionally impacts the infant in a positive way so that it is
motivated to try and reproduce the originally experienced satisfaction. Freud tells us that
the infant, driven by its wish to re-experience the satisfaction associated with the primal
experience, manifests this wish through hallucinations. Ultimately, however, the infant
learns that this method is not effective in producing satisfaction. As Freud puts it, some
“bitter experience of life must have changed this primitive thought-activity into a more
expedient secondary one,” the latter of which allows for perceptual identity to be
established strictly from the direction of the external world (566).
At this point, we should be reminded of our discussion in Chapter Two regarding
repetition o f the drives and satisfaction, which pertain directly to our current
consideration of perceptual identity and the concept of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. In The
Interpretation o f Dreams Freud argues that a secondary process “corrects” the primary
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process (which endeavors to maintain perceptual identity). He calls this secondary
process “thought identity.” He writes,
All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a
satisfaction (a memory which has been adopted as a purposive idea) to an
identical cathexis of the same memory which it is hoped to attain once
more through an intermediate stage of m otor experiences. Thinking must
concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being
led astray by the intensities of those ideas. But it is obvious that
condensations of ideas, as well as intermediate and compromise structures,
must obstruct the attainment of the identity aimed at. Since they substitute
one idea for another, they cause a deviation from the path which would
have led on from the first idea. (602, original italics, emphasis added in
bold)
Freud appears to be suggesting here that thinking (or the secondary process) complicates
any attempt at re-establishing perceptual identity (or the mythic first experience of
satisfaction). He recognizes that due to the structures (of thinking) that organize ideas, a
barrier is erected that obstructs us from obtaining the sought after experience of
satisfaction (the inarticulate thing that perceptual identity tries to capture). The drives re
enter this complex problem precisely through the circuitous route that traces the path of
memory to the attempt at re-experiencing the satisfaction of a need-a path that is
constitutively derailed by demands from the external world. Freud’s suggestion that this
circuitous path is realized through an intermediate stage of motor experiences indicates
that the drives, while preoccupied with the Vorstellungsreprasentanz, are materialized
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through the motility of the body, admittedly in a futile way. While they make do with the
paltry satisfaction they derive from the object, what they really want is precisely what
they cannot have-unmediated enjoyment, which paradoxically is only retroactively
gestured to through repetition.66 Reframing the problem in terms of the shift from the
pleasure to the reality principle, Ellie Ragland argues, “pleasure turns to displeasure
because repetition, by definition, refers to a preceding moment-to the loss of pleasure (or
consistency)” (89). This isn’t to suggest that we do not derive any satisfaction from our
experiences, but rather that the fact we do so in a repetitive fashion indicates that we are
never fu lly satisfied or content. One should be able to sense that we are on our way to
completing the course of our own circuit, for is it not Freud’s grandson, enthralled in his
repetitive game of fort and da, who appears to be aiming at capturing something
unattainable? In other words, the fort/da game stages its own missed encounter, somehow
entangled in the signifying force of speech and materialized in the physical aspects of the
game that both perplex and fascinate Freud’s grandson. Allow us to turn now to where
Lacan takes up the matter himself.

Fort! ( ) Da! (Part II)
Lacan immediately draws attention to the fact that the game of fort/da is indeed a
form of compensation that allows the child to become an agent in the symbolic
disappearance of his mother. However, he advises that this is only of secondary
importance, instead placing the emphasis on the original moment of her departure. We
66
This kind of enjoyment is closely related to one o f the modules of jouissance that Néstor
Braunstein describes as jouissance before the word, “experienced in relation to the mother’s jouissance, to
the proximity of the Thing, a jouissance written on the body, but unnamable, mythical, a retroactive
creation, impossible for the subject already immersed in speech to objectify and consequently, forever
sundered from it, a jouissance of being” (112).
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should add here, which is of the utmost importance, that it must be the moment that the
child recognizes and acknowledges her departure. To a sleeping infant, it hardly makes
any difference if the mother is present or not-what matters is that she is there when he
wakes up! The emphasis here is that the other cannot anticipate all of the infant’s needs.
While visual cues do indeed inform the infant of the other’s presence and absence, its
needs are primarily met by way of skin contact (feeding, cleaning, holding, soothing,
etc.). Therefore the moment that the child realizes that the mother has left him, that her
purpose is not to fulfill all of his needs, and that her attention lies elsewhere, is the
moment that an irreparable rupture introduces lack into the child’s existence. It is at this
moment, from the perspective of the child, that the imaginary other becomes a w-holey
alien Other, which is to say, a desiring Other who has symbolic significance in relation to
the child. This Other desires something else other than the child, which is evident by the
fact that s/he is not always there to immediately tend to the child’s care. The child must
accept that he cannot be everything that s/he desires-that s/he necessary lacks something
in relation to his primary caregiver. We should keep in mind that Freud’s grandson has
already assumed this lack, which is evident by his good behavior and following his
parents’ rules. The game, then, demonstrates his coming to terms with this lack through
his immersion in language. Lacan teases out the implications of this by stating, “the game
of the cotton-reel is the subject’s answer to what the mother’s absence has created on the
frontier of his domain-the edge of his cradleniamely, a ditch, around which one can only
play at jumping” {Seminar X I 62). Fort ( ) da, fort ( ) da...anyone?
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Lacan continues by persuasively arguing that the reel is not the mother, but rather
“a small part of the subject that detaches itself from him while still remaining his, still
retained.” Remember what we said about the signifier earlier? Follow carefully:
If it is true that the signifier is the first mark of the subject, how can we
fail to recognize here-from the very fact that this game is accompanied
by one o f the first oppositions to appear-that it is in the object to which
the opposition is applied in act, the reel, that we must designate the
subject. To this object we will later give then name it bears in the
Lacanian algebra-the petit a.
The activity of the game, Lacan argues, has nothing to do with the level of need or
demand, but rather, and this is precisely his point, that repetition aims at what neither fort
nor da can account for, namely the “mother’s departure as cause of Spaltung (Splitting) in
the subject” (63), which in turn puts him on the trail of desire. In other words, the child
aims for the (lost) object that would, in fantasy, satisfy his desire (a desire, introduced by
the splitting of the subject). The crucial idea to understand here is that the lost object is
not an object at all, but rather a real loss that necessarily initiates and sustains our desire.
Thus when Lacan talks about desire, he isn’t so much referring to the material objects
that we clutter our lives with, moving on from one novelty to the next (although there is
certain enjoyment involved with our engagement with these objects). This is exactly
Lacan’s point: there is no object that would satisfy our desire because what we lack is a
lack-in-being.67 We can therefore only speak of the object-cause of desire, which is the
object-as-absence that we paradoxically fantasize will fill in our lack.

67
In his second seminar, Lacan expresses precisely what is at stake: “Desire is a relation of being
to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn’t the lack of this or that, but lack of being
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While object a is related to the constitutive split in the subject, and such, is
marked by a fundamental absence, we do nevertheless become fixated on representative
objects that stand in for the object a. “They are,” Joan Copjec writes, “simulacra of the
lost (maternal) object...Lacan designates several specific objects: gaze, voice, breast,
phallus” (Imagine There’s No Woman 34). To this list, we will also tentatively add touch,
the implications of which we will address further on in this chapter. These elusive
“objects” necessarily sustain our desire but do not, and more importantly, cannot satisfy
our desire. Thus while object a has a symbolic function, insofar as this functionfa ils and
in turn spurs desire, we relate primarily to this object through, what Lacan calls, the
fundamental fantasy.68 This is most clearly demonstrated by way of his formula, S o a ,
where S designates the split or lacking subject, a stands for the object-cause of our
desire, and o “indicates a set of possible relations between the subject of the
unconscious and its object” (Dean 247). Lacan elaborates on his structuration of fantasy
by arguing:
It is thus as representation's representative in fantasy-that is, as the
originally repressed subject-that S, the barred S of desire, props up the

whereby the being exists” {Seminar I I 223). He more fully develops this idea in Seminar X I when he
theorizes the concepts of alienation and separation —concepts that we have been elucidating thus far
through the example o f the fort/da game. In the process of alienation, Lacan explains, one is forced to
choose either being or meaning, not unlike the example he gives where, held up at gunpoint, one is given
the choice: “Your money or your life!” (210-13). The point here is that in order to become a subject that
has symbolic consistency (meaning), one must give up being or jouissance. In terms of clinical structure,
neurotics are those who have made accepted their position in the Other and have foreclosed being, whereas
psychotics are precisely those who have rejected the Other and remain in a state of pure being (and non
meaning). Separation involves more than a physical separation from the (imaginary) other. What Lacan
calls separation has more to do with the Other, or the person who stands in for the Other (a caretaker, for
instance). Separation precipitates the painful realization that this delegate o f the Other lacks. This requires
that one must accept that s/he cannot be the sole thing that completely satisfies the Other’s desire - that s/he
also lacking. In this way, lack is the contagion par excellence in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory.
68
neurotic fantasy.

In the ensuing discussion, fantasy is discussed strictly according to the clinical structure of
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field of reality here; and this field is sustained only by the extraction of
object a, which nevertheless gives it its frame. (“Psychosis” 487)
Lacan’s theory of fantasy, here spelled inconsequentially with an “f,” mirrors Freud’s
theory of phantasy insofar as both forms of mental activity involve an unknown element
required to sustain them. In Lacan’s account, the field of fantasy is tantamount to
upholding one’s sense of reality, insofar as it reflects the means of coping with the
unbearable reminder that the Other lacks. As Dylan Evans reminds us, Lacan’s theory of
(neurotic) fantasy is essentially the subject’s response to the enigma of the Other’s desire
(Che vuoi?) (60).69 However, in order to sustain the desiring subject’s position and the
fantasy that supports it, the object a must be outside the frame of reality-it has to be
invisible Lacan says, or perhaps, untouchable. Nevertheless, we should not overlook the
fact that Lacan uses the phrase “representation’s representative” to describe what the
subject uses to “prop up the field of reality.” If we recall from earlier in this chapter,
Lacan refers to Vorstellungsreprasentanz as this “representative o f the representation,”
but what does it have to do with the object a involved in fantasy? Copjec offers us a clue
by reminding us that what is at stake with respect to the concept of object a is the
simulacra o f the lost object, which is to say, substitute images or representations that
cover over the glaring gap in the Other.70 This is precisely where the concept of
Vorstellungsreprasentanz is crucial. While the object a necessarily drops out of the frame
that upholds the fantasy, the subject elects a particular (imaginary) object to stand in for
69 Lacan explains the significance of the question, CM vuoi?, through his graphs o f desire in his
essay “Subversion of the Subject.” Faced with the enigma of the Other’s desire, the child is posed with the
insoluble question that he must accept he cannot answer: What does you want (from me)?
70 Copjec provides an excellent commentary on the drives and Vorstellungsreprasentanz in
Imagine There's No Woman, specifically in her first chapter, under the section “The Death Drive: Freud’s
Thesis on Feuerbach” 24-39.
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that lack. Copjec argues that not only is this unique kind of representation related to the
first satisfying object (Nebenmensch), but also that which “allows us to grasp hold of
some nonbeing, some jouissance, or satisfaction” (36). This difficult term implies that in
its formation, it retains part of the Thingness that was inexpressible in the first satisfying
object. Precisely because we cannot return to our blissful state with this object or Thing
(which is itself a fantasy) do we make do with its delegates or part objects in order to
derive morsels of enjoyment or jouissance. Presuming you were lactose tolerant and had
a bottomless pit for a stomach, it would be similar to wanting to exist in an infinite
moment, consuming an endless supply of your favourite ice cream, but instead having to
make due with the sample size portions they hand out at the ice cream parlor and
discovering that you had an infinite selection of lackluster flavours to sample.
The ice cream fantasy/scenario just described not only gestures toward the
deferral of desire, but also the circuit of the drives.71 Lacan’s theory of the drives retains
certain aspects of the Freudian drives, while disposing of others. For instance, Lacan
insists that all drives are partial, relate to the rim structure of the erogenous zones, and
are death-driven. Significantly, however, Lacan rejected the biological (somatic)

71
For example, you try mint-chocolate chip but decide, “no, that’s not it,” then you try peanut
butter ripple, but no, “that’s not it either,” and then you try rocky road, but no, “that’s not it either,” and so
on. This analogy explains how desire is always caught up in the sliding of the signifies This means,
essentially, that because we must express ourselves through language, there is always more that can be
said; the circuit of meaning is never closed, instead, a signifier can only derive meaning by gesturing to the
next signifier in the chain. Something eludes this perpetual chain of signifiers: this something is desire.
While desire leads the subject to conclude “that’s not it” in regards to each sample of ice cream, this
verdict, which leads the subject from object to object, simultaneously facilitates the aim of the drive, whose
object is not the ice cream but “the satisfaction o f the urge to eat” (ZupanCid, Ethics o f the Real 136). This
“urge to eat,” however, should not be confused with the level of need, which would have an object: food.
Drive, on the other hand, strictly speaking has no object. As Lacan puts it, “Even when you stuff the mouth
- the mouth that opens in the register of the drive - it is not the food that satisfies it, it is, as one says, the
pleasure of the mouth” (167). The drive accordingly finds its “object” precisely in the activity of
continuous sampling each mediocre flavour of ice cream: “when we ‘stuff our mouth’, we satisfy the drive,
whether we want to or n o t’ (Zupaniii 243).
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foundation of the Freudian drives, instead insisting that we are dealing with something
purely grammatical {Seminar X I 200). Lacan envisions the drives not as something that
can be traced back to the endosomatic body, but rather as an effect of the impact of the
signifier on the subject. This process undoubtedly does involve the subject’s body,
although when Lacan refers to corporeality he is typically referring to the imaginary
body, not the body that might be confused with the organism, which is more closely
related to the real. Drive therefore emerges as a result of the structure of language
“[carving] up the body” {Television 6)-a structure, we might add, that is first introduced
by way of the Other’s demands. As Marie-Hélène Brousse explains, “the signifier bars
need and produces the drive.” She continues stating, “the drive is the result of the
operation of the signifier on need, which produces a remainder. Something escapes, this
is desire” (106).
Having already established the logic of desire, we now turn to its “evil twin,” the
drive, which according to Brousse arises as a result of trying to respond to the Other’s
demand. The drives emerges because language “gets in the way" of fulfilling need;
however, this is not to suggest that as a result, drive searches for fulfillment that would
“quench its thirst.” Quite the opposite. The drive has no interest in ending, and in fact, it
gets a cruel satisfaction just from the endless game o f guessing, “what object will satisfy
my desire?”72 This resonates with Zupanôiô, who argues, “desire sustains itself by
remaining unsatisfied,” while the drive derives satisfaction precisely through desire’s
endless pursuit of the demanded object that would, in fantasy, complete it {Ethics o f the
Real 242-43). While desire is conceptualized as an endless, linear path of constant

72 Remembering, of course, that desire for Lacan is always desire of the Other (the Other’s desire).
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deferral, the drive is structured as a repetitive, circular motion, which, like desire,
revolves around the object a, yet, unlike desire, revels in this circumnavigation, and is
ultimately satisfied in its very inability to attain the object. Furthermore drive, as Maire
Jaanus explains, “becomes a fetishistic search for what was once ourselves but is now an
extra-bodily, alienated otherness that can “appear” almost anywhere, and in anyone or
anything” (125). Distinguishing between drive and desire, Jaanus argues that the former
“is related to things,” which are “psychic or mere traces of a real thing.” Continuing, she
affirms, “the objects a are only the psychic objects of the drive and merely the psychic
cause of desire” (italics in original). Joined at the proverbial hip of the object a, desire
and drive nevertheless execute radically different tasks with respect to fantasy: the former
establishes a comfortable distance from the thing that would “complete” us (rectify our
lack-in-being), while drive remains content with turning around the object a, flirting with
this little piece o f the real and delighting in the thrill of encircling the void around which
the fantasy of reality is magnificently constructed.
♦

Up to this point, our discussion of the fort/da game in Freud and Lacan has
introduced the several notions of a space or gap that gives rise to repetition in relation to
something that is missed. The first instance of this gap is the physical separation from the
other that has a significant impact on the child. In other words, the child comes to the
painful realization that the other is not always present to cater to its needs. The other
comes and goes, and this becomes a complex problem that the child must come to grips73

73
This is not to suggest that reality is a grand illusion that conceals another, more accurate reality
that we strive to unveil. Instead, Lacan understands fantasy as the field that sustains our desire and shields
us from the unsymbolizable aspects of our symbolic world that if directly encountered disable or disrupt
our imaginary and symbolic senses of “self.”
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with by negotiating its own fragmentary and impulsive drives, perceptions of its
interaction with the outside world, and the field of the Other that attempts to capture and
give meaning to its experiences.
This leads us to the second “gap,” that is, the gap that is inherent in the process of
signification. As we previously noted, the sliding between two signifiers indicates
precisely that there is a constitutive gap that is necessary to engender meaning. We found
evidence of this process in Freud’s conception of “thought identity” which is responsible
for “connecting paths between ideas.” Lacan’s reinterpretation of this process draws
attention to the sliding of the signifier that enables displacement, which he refers to as the
metonymic or diachronic nature o f any system of language. When listening to the other
speak, the provisional meaning of their speech will hinge upon the breaks between each
syllable, word or sentence. Meaning is thus derived from two directions: retroactively
from what has already been said and prospectively from that which has yet to be said,
both of which, structurally speaking, cannot be definitively concluded. Meaning is thus
always situated on a perpetual horizon that we never finally arrive at.
The field of tactile perception introduces another layer into world of the signifier.
In Lacan’s first seminar, he argues, “it’s the symbolic relation which defines the position
o f the subject as seeing. It is speech, the symbolic relation, which determines the greater
of lesser degree of perfection, of completeness, of approximation, of the imaginary”
(iSeminar 1 141). Evidently, Lacan is more or less equating the symbolic with speech, and
the imaginary with the field of vision. His insight, however, is to be found in his
insistence on how the symbolic structures our imaginary encounters, which is to say, our
experiences that are filtered through sensory perceptions. Lacan’s original contribution
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was to show how the signifier, which depends upon structural differences, both
determines the subject as well as her imaginary relations to the external world. This
involves not only defining the position of “the subject as seeing,” but also as the subject
mA

as touching.

Significantly, touch not only defines some of our most intimate sensory

experiences, but it also facilitates a form of communication that in fact predates the
acquisition of speech. Camilla Bosanquet argues that touching is the primary means of
communication for the infant, who uses its whole body to communicate with its mother.
She writes, “Its movements are incomplete and undifferentiated and these have to be
interpreted and completed by the mother. It is his mother’s response to these that helps to
reduce the whole undifferentiated body movements to gestures” (39). In other words, it is
the mother as mother, who in responding to the child’s movements, acts as a
representative o f the Other through her interplay of touches with the child in order to
facilitate the transition of undifferentiated movements into signifying gestures.
Furthermore, drawing from the lived experiences of Helen Keller,7475 Diamond contends
that Keller learned language “through developing an understanding of die differences
between one kind of mark and another, a repertoire of small differences that were built
into patterns of sense” (87). Diamond’s analysis is amicable to our reading of Lacan
insofar as she draws attention to how difference is built into patterns of sense, which is to
say, patterns of meaning, as well as patterns of differential tactile sensations. These
examples prompt us to think about how different forms of touch convey meaning, as well
74 In addition, the position of the subject as hearing is undoubtedly implied in Lacan’s speaking
subject. However, it is irrefutable that those who are bom mute, deaf, and/or blind are just as capable of
establishing subject positions as those who are privileged with speech, hearing, and sight, hence our
emphasis on the play of the signifier rather than its specific material manifestation.
75 Helen Keller contracted an illness during her infancy that rendered her deaf and blind. She
nevertheless was capable of learning a symbolic language through her sense of touch and remarkably, years
later, taught herself how to speak by “listening” to others by way of tracing the movements of their lips.
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as elude meaning, insofar as like speech, touch is also incapable of completely bracketing
off the intended message. We will re-address this issue closer to the end of the chapter.
Presently, however, we would like to address another gap involved in the process
of signification, which again involves the interplay of presence and absence. Namely,
when we invoke a symbol, we are attempting to give presence to the thing that is absent.
For example, when we speak about an apple, we can only produce the sound-image
“apple” and conjure up the visual image (or the qualities of its taste or texture) that we
associate with the word “apple.” Even if the physical apple is nearby, the fact that we use
the specific word “apple” to refer to it introduces a gap between what is intended (the
thing) and its representation (the signifier). This is why, in his first seminar, Lacan says,
“To think is to substitute the word elephant for elephants, and a ring for the sun. You
realise of course that there is an abyss between this thing which is phenomenologically
the sun.. .and a ring” (225). Crucially, Lacan once again stresses that the latter only has
value in relation to other symbols that comprise a symbolic network. While we have
already established that the sliding between signifiers is described as a diachronic or
metonymic relationship, the substitution o f one signifier for another within the signifying
chain is referred to as the synchronic or metaphoric dimension of language.
Fundamentally, the logic of metaphor is the means by which the unconscious is founded,
insofar as the process of naming “the thing” (substitution) only gamers meaning in
relation to other signifiers, not from the thing-in-itself, indicating that something is lost
(or repressed) in the leap from the Thing to its representation. This “leap” is also the
means of establishing identification, which according to Lacan, takes place through the
imaginary order. As we suggested earlier, Lacan insists that identification is facilitated
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through the mirror stage, which he describes primarily through the visual field. Do we
then read him literally, or can the implications of the mirror stage extend more broadly to
include other sensory perceptions?

The Mirror Stage, revisited
A gloss of the English translations of Lacan’s seminars and written work will
suffice to demonstrate the centrality of vision and the specular in his theorization of the
imaginary. With respect to his seminars, we find Lacan beginning to sketch out the
parameters of the imaginary in Seminar I by utilizing the diagram of “The experiment of
the inverted bouquet” (79), and its subsequent developments and modifications (124,139,
165). This diagram shows how all images are produced by the reflection of light in the
vision field, and therefore are subject to contingency, manipulation, and misperception.
In Seminar VII, he addresses Hans Holbein’s painting of “The Ambassadors” in relation
to the optical illusion known as anamorphosis (135, 140). Furthermore, in Seminar XI,
Lacan devotes an entire (weekly) seminar on the importance of anamorphosis, which is
framed within a larger section of the book that is dedicated to the gaze as object a.
Prefacing his trajectory of developing the imaginary, however, is his seminal
paper on the mirror stage.7677 In this paper, entitled “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I

76
Anamorphosis is an optical illusion whereby an aspect o f a pictorial representation can only be
viewed from a unique angle. The painting of “The Ambassadors” that Lacan addresses in relation to
anamorphosis depicts two gentlemen, both looking outward, posed next to a shelf displaying various
objects. In the lower-center of the painting there is a slanted, skewed image that at first glance, does not
register as anything recognizable. In his discussion of the painting, Lacan describes the illusion as follows:
“the skull emerges when, having passed in front o f it, you leave the room by a door located so that you see
it in its sinister truth, at the very moment when you turn around to look at it for the last time” {Seminar VII
140).
77
Lacan first delivered his essay on the mirror stage at the Sixteenth International Congress of
Psychoanalysis in 1949, which was later published in his major written work, Écrits (1966).
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Function,” Lacan theorizes that at the heart of the imaginary is a misrecognition that
founds all subsequent identifications. He explains that between the ages of six and
eighteen months, the infant, who is “still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling
dependence” (76), becomes transfixed by its own image or imago that is reflected in the
mirror. This identification, which Lacan calls a “transformation that takes place in the
subject when he assumes.. .an image” (76), is a misrecognition because it is contingent
upon the infant identifying with a visual image outside of itself, which Lacan views as an
essentially alienating experience. “The mirror stage,” Lacan claims,
is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency
to anticipation-and, for the subject caught up in the lure of spatial
identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of
the body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its totality-and to
finally the donned armor o f an alienating identity that will mark his entire
mental development with its rigid structure. (78)
Here, Lacan is trying to illuminate how the infant is seduced by the cohesiveness o f its
reflected image, which in comparison to the sensations generated by its own impulsively
divergent and fragmentary body, seems like a superior alternative. By identifying with
the image, the child assumes a sense of control that will be exercised through the reign of
the imago. This process of identification is dependent on the reassuring looks and
gestures of the parent that confirm to the infant that the image is its own. It also confirms
the metaphoric nature of identification, whereby the image stands in fo r the infant, but
*7fi

importantly is not same thing as the infant.78

78
As with the synchronic axis of language, identification with the mirror image implicates a gap
between the thing and its representation.
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The implications of the mirror stage extend more broadly to suggest the ways in
which we mediate our identifications through the world of images, and that those
identifications are reliant upon a reflexive motion that founds the self or ego. Within the
visual field, Lacan designates this motion as a fundamental moment of misrecognition. It
is less clear, however, if and how this misrecognition translates to the field of touch,
considering that this specific sensory perception is experienced through contact with the
skin as opposed to the processing of light through the apparatus of the eye. As Lacan
acknowledged earlier, touch depends upon an immediacy that distinguishes it from sight.
This acknowledgment, however, requires a further distinction. Arguably, the images that
fill our field of vision are also perpetually present, which is to say that it is only due to the
fact that we are constantly flooded with images that we become desensitized to this visual
onslaught. Only when we close our eyes can we shut out the immediacy of the visual
field-an effort that is only partially successful once one takes into account the
dreamscape where spectral images continue to haunt the subject.79 Touch, on the other
hand, involves a physical immediacy, not just a temporal dimension, but in addition a
corporeal proximity. It is this corporeal dimension that Lacan is resistant to discussing or
elaborating upon. Curiously, however, Lacan does leave open the possibility o f theorizing
the mirror stage according to the senses other than sight, a prospect that he only hints at
in one of his relatively unknown, published articles. Explicating his renowned mirror
stage, Jacqueline Rose draws attention to this passing remark. Quoting Lacan, Rose
writes, “the idea of the mirror should be understood as an object that reflects-not just the
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In contrast the skin, as Anzieu observes, “cannot reject any vibro-tactile or electro-tactile sign,”
nor can it “close like the eyes or the mouth, [or] be stopped up like the ears and nose” (14-15).
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visible, but also what is heard, touched and willed by the child” (53, emphasis added).80
If Lacan was willing to recognize that touch could be also understood through his theory
of the mirror stage, why did he never develop any account of it in his development of the
imaginary order?
While it is indisputable that vision, for those privileged with sight, does play a
constitutional role in founding a sense of self that is predominantly imagistic, Lacan
nevertheless overlooks the fact that perception of touch develops prior to the optimization
of sight. Largely influenced by Anzieu and his work on the skin ego, Claudia Benthien
argues not only it is at the boundary of the skin where we encounter one another, but also
that the surface of the body is also the site where identity is determined (1). She reminds
us that for the newborn, “the skin is the most important organ for communication and
contact,” and furthermore that it is through the skin that the infant “learns the first
feelings of pleasure and displeasure,” primary experiences which are crucial to
establishing “close connections between skin sensations and emotional states” (7).
Considering the developmental significance of communication, affectivity, and
identification, it is perplexing that Lacan rarely gives this form of sensory perception any
consideration in his psychoanalytic account of the imaginary order. Furthermore, Lacan’s
insistence on the imaginary “wholeness” of the image is not necessarily degraded once it
is applied to the tactile field; instead it is only applied differently. As Anzieu suggests,
the skin ego must be thought of as a totality, as a “bodily envelope” (38). Admittedly
occurring on different planes, we are still confronted with an image or sensation that
relies upon the reflexive motion that is implicated in the mirror stage in order to posit the

80
The original citation as provided by Rose: Lacan, Jacques. “Cure psychanalytique á Paide de la
poupée fleur.” Revue française de la psychanalyse 4, October-December (1949): 567.
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ego. Here we might think of touch as a kind of sonar on the surface of the body, where
the other’s caress stimulates the nerve endings of the skin. Considering that Freud
theorizes the skin as the erotogenic zone par excellence, the surface of the body becomes
a map for charting sensation and stimulation. Visually, we might imagine this occurring
similar to how a photographer captures light trails or streaks using longer exposure times.
As the child experiences different parts of its body being touched, it gains a more
comprehensive account of the sensation-image of the body or, to use Anzieu’s term, the
envelope that constitutes the self. What is required, therefore, is a more complex model
that would take into account the overlapping perceptions and sensations that reflexively
constitute the ego through the mirror stage.
Importantly, the mirror stage not only involves the infant looking at its reflected
image in the mirror, which is validated by the gaze of the Other, but it is also confirmed
through the face-to-face interactions with the Other, which involve mirroring each other’s
touches through skin contact. Touch both confirms one’s identity with and one’s
separation from the Other. Misrecognition resurfaces, perhaps, through bodily encounters
where those lines of identity between self and other are no longer clearly demarcated. Or,
it may be that the misrecognition of touch is illuminated precisely at the limit where the
body (or a part of the body) is perceived as something radically Other, in turn
retroactively gesturing toward the perpetual re-cognition or repetition of sensations that
reassures the subject of their corporeal consistency. Misrecognition would therefore lie
precisely in the reliance upon image, smell, sound, or sensation to mirror the “truth” of
the ego back to the subject, a truth that can only be upheld through the repetition that
sustains it. In other words, the ego cannot assert its own autonomy; instead it relies upon
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the kaleidoscope of sensory perceptions that we assume reflects a cohesive wholeness, an
assumption that ensnares the subject in the lure of the imaginary.

Touch My Desire
To take the mirror stage literally, we should also remember that the image in the
mirror, while “whole” insofar as it is two-dimensionally seamless, is nevertheless a partimage that allows the child to phantasmatically imagine its body viewed in totality, as
well as in pieces. Similarly, when a child is scooped up and held in its parent’s arms, the
ensuing sensations not only make the child aware of its own body, but they also engender
phantasies relating to parts of the body that are touched, untouched, as well as touched
from all sides. This last example should remind us of Lacan’s consideration of the
phenomenological implications of the gaze when he writes that one of its conditions is
the fact that one can be looked at from all sides {Seminar X I 72). He argues:
The gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency,
symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust o f our experience,
namely, the lack that constitutes castration anxiety. The eye and the gazethis is for us the split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the
scopic field. (72-73)
Lacan’s definition of the gaze-the object a of the visual field-is particularly useful to our
discussion because it addresses all of the major ideas that have been raised in this chapter.
When Lacan says that the gaze is presented as “the lack that constitutes castration
anxiety,” he is referring to the lack upon which the desiring subject is erected (as we
witnessed with Freud’s grandson and the game of fort/da). In terms of being situated “on
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the horizon,” Lacan is referring here to the frame of reality and the fantasy that supports
it. The gaze must necessarily drop out of this frame in order to sustain the subject’s
position in relation to his or her desire. Finally, the split between the eye and the gaze that
manifests the drive is nothing other than “the subjective division itself, expressed in the
field of vision” (Evans 72). The question remains, however, how this division expresses
itself in the haptic field. Is touch, as the cause of our desire, a corporeal, proximate
experience, or rather a phantasmatic encounter of contact with the other? How are we to
understand the means by which the haptic field unfolds in the field of the Other?
At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the game of fort/da that, as
we’ve previously explained, begins to account for the psychodynamics of space within
the field of the Other. In other words, language becomes a means of coping with a
constitutive loss of intimacy or, as Copjec puts it, the loss of jouissance that attaches the
infant to its caretaker, which in turn depletes the whole of its being (Imagine There’s No
Woman 35). In the game of fort/da, Freud’s grandson gives presence to the space opened
up by absence of the toy through the signifier “fort” (gone). This particular signifier is
exemplary of how language intervenes to re-present that which is no longer there,
testifying to the way in which absence is built into the structure of language. Diamond,
who argues that touch “operates in a way analogous to the function of language” (80),
and depends upon “a play of absence in presence” (88), enables us to begin thinking
about how touch is structured by these absences, and more fundamentally, by that which
remains perpetually out of reach. Approaching this problem from a slightly different
angle, we might start with, as Diamond does, by drawing attention to the relationality of
touch. “For touch to be touching,” Diamond writes, “it affects us and implies a relation
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with the other” (83-84). This relation implies not only the sensations of touch and the
affective responses they elicit, but also a means of establishing a dialogue with the Other.
Accordingly, the exchange or interplay of touch generates meaning and in turn introduces
the enigma of desire into the tactile field. What does this mean, exactly? If Diamond
insists upon the punctuation of touch or the “rhythmic dissonance and relations of
difference” that endows touch with meaning, then what we discover in the haptic field is
precisely the sliding of the signifier that introduces cause into the subject. In other words,
touch is always already caught in the field of the Other. Corporeal engagements must
then (symptomatically) reflect how the subject relates to his or her desire as it is
manifested at the level of touch.
As the object-cause of desire, touch would therefore be defined not according to
the point of contact itself, but instead embodied somehow in the configuration of space
that positions the subject in relation to the Other. While this topography may risk reading
Lacan’s theory of fundamental fantasy too literally, we must keep in mind that “space” is
never just a physical or spatial relation, it is first and foremost a psychical negotiation.
Another way of approaching this problem is again through the analogy of the gaze. Lacan
enigmatically tells us that
In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way
of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips,
passes, is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree
eluded in it—this is what we call the gaze. (Seminar X I 73)
Without pushing the comparison too far, might we use Lacan’s description of the gaze to
conceptualize how touch as the object-cause of desire slips between the cracks in our
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fingers, escapes our grasp, and remains out of reach? Conversely, the simulacra of this
untouchable element would enable the subject to imagine a sense of continuity,
complementarity, or consistency in the haptic field, which is to say, that the space inbetween can be fully exhausted or traversed. Following Lacan’s assertion that the gaze is
not a seen gaze, “but a gaze imagined by [the subject] in the field of the Other” (84),
touch as object a would follow a similar trajectory, encapsulated in an imaginary moment
o f contact or, perhaps, a tactile attribute that captivates the subject. For example, JuanDavid Nasio argues, “the object a can be experienced.. .as the softness of the skin in the
tactile hallucination” (95). In the case of an imaginary encounter, how would the object a
materialize as an action that involves the subject? It would be useful to recall from our
introduction the patient who wished that Freud would kiss her. Her phantasy likely
involved a visual projection of how this encounter would play out, but it also would have
incorporated the element of touch as well: the specter of the kiss. Can the advance by the
Other, represented in this case by the kiss, be taken as the cause of desire?
We should remain mindful of the split that constitutes the object a. In the above
example, the action of being kissed does not satisfy desire, rather it is the prospect or
anticipation of being kissed that manifests in the phantasy and sustains her desire. To
ensure that we are as clear as possible, allow us to reiterate what is at stake for Lacan in
subjectivity:
It is here that I propose that the interest the subject takes in his own split
is bound up with that which determines it-namely, a privileged object,
which has emerged from some primal separation, from some self-
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mutilation induced by the very approach of the real, whose name, in our
algebra, is the objet a. (Seminar X I 83)
For Lacan, primal separation does not occur as the ripping of two bodies apart, but rather
at the sites, or rather rims, of the body where inside meets outside: “the lips, “the
enclosure of the teeth,” the rim of the anus, the penile groove, the vagina, and the slit
formed by the eyelids, not to mention the hollow of the ear” (“Subversion” 692). From
these rims, the object a falls, and “[this] fall is primal” (Television 85). Again, these
“objects” are not simply missing parts of the body that one seeks to re-find. If anything,
the object a ’s are associated with that which is produced by the body and becomes
detachable from it. While the objects we are concerned with here are indeed lost, they
cause desire through the subject’s dialectical relationship to the barred Other, the Other
that lacks. As Lacan emphasizes, “the diversity of forms taken by the object of the fall
ought to be related to the manner in which the desire of the Other is apprehended by the
subject.” While Lacan situates the oral and anal objects in relation to the demands of the
Other, he theorizes two additional objects specifically in relation to desire: that of the
gaze and the voice. More difficult to pin down, these objects elusively cause our desire,
which we in turn apprehend through the lure of the imaginary. Notably, Lacan chooses
two objects that are derived from two of the corporeal senses: sight and hearing. This is
not to conflate, for example, the gaze with sight, but rather to simply illuminate their
association.81 It does, however, problematize our earlier use of the term “touch” as an
object a. If touch can be understood as a lost object, it would require a different term to

81 Lacan makes this clear in Seminar X I during his seminar on “The Split between the Eye and the
Gaze.” While the eye is aligned with the point of view of the subject as looking, that which perpetually
eludes the field the vision represents the gaze.
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make it distinct from that of the bodily sense: something the subject thinks s/he loses that
can be apprehended in the Other, or as something the Other does to the subject.
In his rigorous analysis of the object a, Dean creatively plays with this complex
concept in several productive ways that may shed light on the function of touch with
respect to desire. At first glance, it may appear antithetical to theorize how physical
contact with any portion of the skin that does not involve an erogenous rim can be
implicated in the structure of desire and circuit of the drive. In Seminar XI, Lacan depicts
the circuit of the drive in the seminar, “The Partial Drive and Its Circuit” (178). He
explicitly describes this diagram of the drive as the “circular movement of the thrust that
emerges through the erogenous rim only to return to it as its target, after having encircled
something I call the objet a” (194). This has the potential to severely limit the scope of
our analysis, unless we 1) draw out the implications of the structure of the rim, and 2)
magnify our perspective of the body. First, it is worth repeating Jaanus’s earlier point
about the drive, which reinforces a more general rule in both Freudian and Lacanian
psychoanalysis: the object is not an object “out there” in the world, rather it is a primarily
a psychical object. While encircling the rims of the body certainly titillates the sexual
imaginary, Lacan, in outlining the circuit of the drives as he does above, is drawing
attention to the psychical activity of the drives that involves turning around the
representative of the lacking object: the Vorstellungsreprasentanz. This does not,
however, negate the significance of our physical engagements with objects and people in
the external world. Contrary to the argument that “psychoanalysis is...grounded on a
denial o f the body,”82 a more accurate portrayal of psychoanalysis would maintain how

82 Prosecuting Lacan for “egocide,” Jacob Rogozinski argues that “he will never seek to specify
which conceptions of the body are at stake in his theory; and his remarks on the corporeal origin of the ego,
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the subject is continually reminded of the corpore(a)l body. One of the ways in which the
subject is reminded of its corporeal existence is precisely through the remainder that falls
away as the result o f the impact of language on the body.
Secondly, and related to our first point, we should not read Lacan as disregarding
the significance of the erogenous body. His list of bodily rims suggests that he recognizes
the extent to which the body is implicated in language and being. The skin, however, that
stretches between the sites of these rims is given an undetermined status by Lacan. What
are we to make of this impasse? Dean gives an imaginative reply by extending the
metaphor of the mouth to the entire surface of the body. He suggests, “Why not think of
the pores in our skin-which also breathe, absorb, and excrete-as mouths?” (256). The
idea o f a thousand, if not a million mouths covering the surface of the body exposes the
fixed scope by which we usually visualize the body, a fiction that reveals how we view
and tolerate the imaginary body. Ultimately, Dean maintains that the key to erotogenicity
is not due to a physical stimulus but rather to “fantasmatic investment” (257). Dean’s
recourse to fantasy is not undeserving however it remains unclear as to what exactly is
lost, or thought to be lost, through the pores of the skin. And yet this is where the
operative cut of the signifier is pertinent. By zoning the body, and in turn, the body’s
social relationship to others through the symbolic, the subject can only imagine or
anticipate what has been lost due to the cuts of the signifier. As Dean puts it, these cuts
refer to bodily borders, “wherever inside meets outside” (196). But the cutting done by
the symbolic also impacts and zones the surface of the skin as well, and erotogenicity,
insofar as it depends upon libidinal investment, is thus also subject to displacement to

on the primacy of touching or the originary “signs o f perception,” will remain inconsequential for the
development of psychoanalysis” (72). See Rogozinski 48-77.
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practically any part of the body. Fantasy allows the subject to imagine the object that is
cut away from the surface of the skin and tries to re-find-whether it be in the form of
another tactile surface (skin, satin, water, rubber, latex, wax, etc.), a particular object or
part o f the body, or through an action that involves the subject in some way (an embrace,
caress, massage, whipping, spanking, handshake, etc.). Reworking Lacan’s theory
regarding the primal fall of the object, Dean entertains this possibility of the object a
taking the form of an action rather than an imaginary thing. Dean once again asks a
wonderfully thought provoking question: “what causes the object to fall?” (197). In other
words, the object may appear “as the effect of some action on [the subject’s] body, rather
than preexisting in object form” (196). By shifting the register of the object-cause of
desire from noun to verb, Dean, by way o f Lacan, opens up the possibilities for the
imaginary representation of the object a to be represented by an action done to the body,
such as a particular way that one is touched by the Other.
Paradoxically, the moment we make contact with the imaginary lure of desire, we
are still left, in some way, unsatisfied. Not only do these encounters leave us wanting
more, but also our enjoyment is dependent upon the repeated loss of that touch, like
Freud’s grandson who took greater delight in letting go of the toy than in its return to his
grasp. In the first movement-that o f making contact, but wanting more-something slips
from the encounter itself, a certain sought after consistency that is missing from one
encounter to the next. As soon as touch is present, something is absent. The second
movement involves an oscillation between pain and joy that is contingent upon a loss, a
distancing. Pleasure, in the purely physiological sense, may be found in the point of
contact or the experience of presence, but enjoyment-closer to the register of jouissance-
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is located somewhere in-between presence and absence, a palpable void that we, as
subjects o f desire, are compelled to endlessly encircle in a perpetual reconfiguration of
surfaces, body parts, and positions. Neither fort nor da, the object that sustains our desire
is unquestionably that which remains untouchable in the real, forever and elusively out of
reach, yet always situated on the horizon where we, as subjects o f the drive collide, only
to break beautifully, ecstatically, and often devastatingly, apart.
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Conclusion

Our survey of touch has covered considerable ground, from Freud to Lacan, and
in doing so has attempted to understand the intricacies of corporeal touch within the
bounds of psychoanalytic theory-a difficult challenge considering the root word of
psychoanalysis denotes that which relates to the mind and not the body. Nevertheless
since its inception psychoanalysis arguably has been in a constant dialogue with the body,
which is to say that the work of analysis is facilitated through listening to the body talk.
This is not to bypass or dimmish the role o f the psyche, but rather to recognize that one
speaks not only through the body (diaphragm, throat, mouth, tongue, teeth, lips, etc.) but
also as a corporeal subject. The unconscious, which psychoanalysis takes seriously, bears
witness to the inconsistencies or impasses that arise precisely because we are embodied
subjects. As Lacan aptly states, “the subject of the unconscious is only in touch with the
soul via the body, by introducing thought into it.. .thought is in disharmony with the soul”
(Television 6). This discord speaks to the incompatibility of language and the bodylanguage does not come from with/« the body, rather it ex-sists (it comes from the Other).
That stated, however, ‘thought’, which Lacan so earnestly draws to our attention, has
been conventionally viewed as antithetical to touch. In her paper “Between Touches,”
Nicola Diamond draws attention to the post-enlightenment hierarchy of the senses
inherited by psychoanalysis. She argues that touch has been traditionally aligned with the
body, “rooted in its materiality, close to nature and animality,” whereas thinking is not of
corporeality and “is associated with the “higher-order” faculties, speech, thought,
language, and culture” (82). Pointedly, she summarizes this dichotomy by remarking,
“thinking is aligned with speech-the talking cure-and not to touch” (81).

I ll

Indeed, as we discovered in our brief historical overview of the origins of
psychoanalysis, any physical contact between analyst and analysand was quickly
eradicated in favour of isolating the transference specifically through the medium of
speech. Importantly, Freud’s development o f psychoanalysis as a therapeutic intervention
was contingent upon historical and cultural factors, as well as his own biases that were
shaded by the dominant medical and scientific communities of his time. His insistence
that the work of analysis hinged upon speaking one’s desire rather than attempting to
reach out and touch one’s desire reflects a particular set of parameters for the
transference-relationship. Undoubtedly, Freud’s approach to analysis was indicative of
his own drive to be in control of all the elements of the analytic setting-not unlike
overseeing an experiment in a laboratory. The introduction of touch into that sanitized
setting, erotic or otherwise, would introduce an unpredictable factor into the work of
analysis and contaminate the transference-relationship, or so Freud believed. One of the
repercussions of his ceremonial approach to analysis, which included the rule of physical
abstinence, was the taboo on touching that the psychoanalytic establishment inherited and
unquestioningly accepted. Not surprisingly, then, the role and significance of touch in
relation to psychodynamic and psychoanalytic therapies has received little attention until
relatively recently.83 Ironically, it may reside in the fact that psychoanalysis, as a
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As Susie Orbach points out in her forward to Touch Papers, psychoanalysis has been with us for
over a hundred years, during which time, ever-changing cultural landscapes have intermingled and our
approach to mental health has adopted multi-pronged treatments that may involve multiple settings and a
variety o f different health practitioners. She argues that we need not lift the prohibition of touch, but rather
establish a dialogue on the issue o f touch, the latter o f which seems to have its own taboo within
psychoanalytic circles. Significantly, the issue of touch, she argues, needs to be addressed not only in
relation to incidents where patients make (physical) contact with their analysts, but also regarding situations
where the analyst touches his or her patient, die latter o f which does happen but is largely underreported.
Furthermore, Diamond suggests that if touch is used in the analytic setting, “It is important to be engaged
in a historical reconstruction of the analysand’s tactile attachment relations and meanings from the situation
of the present context and the analytic relationship, including the analyst’s personal relationship to touch,
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discourse that specializes in the medium of speech, harbors its own resistances to what
can be said about our experiences of touch, in turn gesturing towards that which remains
utterly unspeakable, yet profoundly moving about the multifarious ways that we come
into contact with one another.
Putting the issue of physical touch aside for a moment, it would be foolish to
reduce psychoanalysis simply to verbal exchange. While analysis does hinge upon a
particular kind o f speech, that of free association, it is also dependent upon carefully
navigating the emotional or affective minefield of the analysand. This is a daunting task
for both the analysand and the analyst. For the analyst, carefully choosing his or her
words is paramount to tactfully engaging the analysand’s resistances without setting off
an emotional catastrophe that would endanger the transference-relationship.
“Interpretation,” Susie Orbach argues, “is a concept that involves in its very essence the
notion o f reaching and touching someone emotionally on many levels simultaneously”
(xvii). She continues by suggesting that the very goal of analysis is harnessing the affect
laden effects of language in order to bring about change, which is to say, to alleviate the
analysand’s suffering. Interpretation, however, is only a tool of analysis. The real work is
required by the analysand, who knows not what s/he says, but undergoes analysis in order
to learn something new about him- or herself. This is a process that focuses more on
tearing walls down instead of building them up. Indeed, to carry the comparison further,
analysis has less to do with fashioning oneself in the ideal image of the perfect home and

so that countertransference experience can be reflected upon continuously” (91). For more on the recent
literature on touch and psychodynamic and psychoanalytic therapy, see eds. Smith et aL, The Ethical Use o f
Touch in Psychotherapy (1998), Hunter and Struve, Touch in Psychotherapy (1998), and ed. Galton, Touch
Papers (2006).
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has more to do with shaking the foundations of the house that one already occupies in
order to emerge altered in a significant way.
If psychoanalysis therefore depends upon the relationship between affect and
language in order to facilitate therapeutic aims, what have we learned about the position
of touch within this model? Firstly, we agree with Diamond who argues, “touch can be
discriminating, subtle, express deep feeling, and multiple possible meanings” (89). And
while touch conveys meaning as well as provides sensory perceptions, there is a
primordial underside of touch that simultaneously expresses the whims of the drives as
well as gamers the superfluity of libido. Before one has mastered spoken language, which
is to say, can use speech proficiently, existence is swept up in waves of sensations,
sounds, images, and impulses. Amidst this chaos, the infant knows neither restraint nor
the prohibition of law. This, of course, is where Freud and Lacan differ on their theories
of the drive. While Freud believed that the drives originate in the realm of the primitive
id, Lacan insisted that they only arise as a result of the signifier’s impact on the organism.
Still, both theoretical perspectives retain the common elements of repetition, activity, and
libido. Freud’s continual shift away from the immediacy of the body, however, appears to
support Lacan’s move to focus more on the psychical effects of the signifier in relation to
the pulsion of the drives. Nevertheless, “Three Essays” offers corporeal clues as to how
touch operates under the sway of the drives. We agree with Freud’s position that physical
contact is involved in the production of libido or obtaining satisfaction, which is to say,
“a certain amount of touching is indispensible...before the normal sexual aim can be
attained” (156).84 As he continues shortly thereafter, “everyone knows what a source of

84
By “normal” sexual aim, Freud is referring to genital satisfaction that becomes possible with the
advent of puberty and not in regards to sexual object choice. Considering our alignment with Lacan on the
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pleasure on the one hand and what an influx of fresh excitation on the other is afforded
by tactile sensations of the skin of the sexual object.” Indeed, our analysis of the
component drives revealed how the infant’s relationship to its primary caretaker(s) is
structured by intimate contact with the erogenous zones. These zones, Freud realizes,
“show a special intensification of a kind o f susceptibility to stimulus which is possessed
in a certain degree by the whole cutaneous surface” (201). Moreover, while Freud insists
upon “predestined erotogenic zones” (i.e. the oral zone), he is ultimately led to conclude,
“the quality of stimulus has more to do with producing pleasurable feeling than has the
nature of the part of the body concerned” (183). What does Freud mean here? Does this
verdict necessarily relegate touch to a secondary status?
In the same subsection, Freud goes on to discuss his observations of erotogenic
displacement in the symptomology of hysteria. He observes that in cases of hysteria,
repression affects the genital zones, which in turn transmit their susceptibility to
stimulation to other erotogenic zones. Significantly, displacement is not a physiological
process, but rather a result of a psychical defense mechanism. The slippage of
erotogenicity not only depends on libidinal investment, which reflects a psychic effort,
but also points to the precariousness of tactile sensory perception. It is not that the
hysteric’s symptoms (i.e. paralysis of a limb) display how mental functioning goes awry,
thus reinforcing a dichotomy of what is normal and what is pathological. Instead, hysteria
illuminates how erotogenicity is from the beginning, pathological. Touch therefore
depends upon a complex relationship of physiology, surveillance, signification, phantasy,

issue of genital primacy, we prefer to read Freud here as stating that a certain amount of touching is
indispensibie for all the partial drives to obtain their sexual aim, which is always satisfaction.
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and libidinal investment, framed with the larger context of our social relationships with
others.
Notably, touch can also be symptomatic of what cannot be expressed in language,
which brings us back to the repetition of the drives. This is to say that touch can be the
outpouring of that which is inexpressible in language. A common example can be taken
from the scenario where a parent is attempting to console their child who has only begun
to learn how to speak. The parent speaks a stream of words to the child, most of which it
doesn’t understand. Frustration builds until the child erupts in a temper tantrum: arms and
legs flail, spit flies, teeth gnash, tears fall, and screaming prevails over diplomatic
conversation. Even as adults, crises or tantrums are often accompanied by a physical
collapse, an urge for violent contact, or a regressive wish for close comfort. In his final
rendition of the drives, Freud concluded that our most compelling impulses or urges
could be grouped according to either the life or death drives. As we noted from Freud’s
own observations, Eros or the libidinal components of the drives are far more accessible
to study. The death drive is far less conspicuous. Freud theorizes that one of its
representatives is sadism, and elsewhere concludes that we only know the death drive by
virtue of it being turned outward to the external world through the musculature of the
body. In drawing from the example of the fort/da game, we attempted to show how the
game was exemplary of the defining characteristics of the drives. Significantly, the
repetition o f throwing and/or retrieving the toy signals a traumatic or missed encounter
that the multiple possible interpretations of the game bear witness to. This missed
encounter has to do with the loss of intimate touch and physical separation from the other
that is constitutively traumatic for the infant. Furthermore, renouncing one’s close
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physical bonds can only be understood (made sense of, dealt with, etc.) through one’s
relationship to the symbolic Other. Testifying to this relationship is one of Freud’s
interpretations of the game in which his grandson only repeats the first part of the game.
Having accepted that he cannot be the sole thing his mother desires, the little boy believes
that his father has unfairly taken his place as the object of desire,85 hence his
proclamation “Go to the fwont!”86 In order to emerge from this classical case of the
Oedipal complex, the little boy must accept that desire lies elsewhere, outside the familial
triangle.
Further contextualizing our analysis, Anzieu’s theory of the double prohibition on
touching demonstrates precisely the physical prerequisites to the Oedipal complex, which
fuses together Freudian and Lacanian insights. Reflecting the shift from the pleasure to
the reality principle, Freud’s insistence that all children must renounce instinctual
satisfaction aligns with Anzieu’s remarks concerning prohibiting intimate forms of
embrace and (culturally) inappropriate touching. Furthermore, by drawing attention to the
speech requirement that supersedes touch, Anzieu’s observation permits us to explore
how touch might be taken up within a Lacanian paradigm. Implicit in the parent’s verbal
interdiction is the demand that the child responds in speech instead of gesturing or
grasping. Insofar as the symbol orientates the infant’s entire outlook, which is to say,
determines its position in relation to the Other and colors its perceptual apprehension of
the phenomenal world, touch is one of the ways it attempts to grapple with reality.

85 Lacan refers to this “object” as the imaginary phallus or the thing that the child imagines fills in
the lack in the Other.
86 Freud deduces that his grandson must have overheard that his father was “at the front” (at war,
absent), and in turn this expression accompanied the gesture of making the toy disappear. In phantasy, this
allows the child to once again have his mother all to himself.
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Furthermore, signifiers cut up the tactile field in such a way that touching everything
becomes a structural impossibility. In other words, becoming a subject not only requires
that one use signifiers to mediate the socio-symbolic worlds we inhabit, but also that one
sacrifice some part of their being or jouissance. As a result of this splitting, desire and
drive emerge as psychical structures that implicate corporeality in the formation of their
objectives.
One of our aims, therefore, in establishing a dialogue on touch and Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory has been to explore how touch functions as the object-cause of
desire. While touch functions according to both to its signifying and sensory capacities,
something slips in the haptic field. In other words, at the level of physical touch there is
an element that resists symbolization, which undoubtedly has to do with the subject’s
relation to the Other. We have approached this resistant element primarily with respect to
object a, which is to say the remainder or lost object of touch that the subject seeks to refind. Touch, however, is always in some way disappointing insofar as the haptic field
unfolds in the field of the Other. This is not to suggest that our intimate moments shared
with others are not meaningful-quite the contrary. It is precisely because our physical
relationships with others are saturated with meaning that they are always already
ensnared in the metonymic sliding of the signifier. Touch therefore always leaves
something in-between to be desired. At the same time, however, touch also follows the
circuit of the drives. While we agree that the drives are first and foremost a psychical
activity, we are also convinced that the body is implicated in the compulsion of the drives
and their repetitions to go beyond the pleasure principle. This “beyond” gestures to what
Braunstein, by way of Lacan, summarizes as “beyond the word, beyond the regulation of
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the Law and the phallus, jouissance of the Other, feminine jouissance, which for the same
reason - lying somewhere beyond speech - is equally impossible to objectify, impossible
for the parletre to articulate” (112). While this “parletre” or “speaking being” is also a
being that speaks through touch and signifying gestures, touch is also that which
conversely marks the intrusion of the real. Captured in an ephemeral moment of brute
force or rapturous bliss, touch has the ability to radically displace us from ourselves.
Touch is always, therefore, a precarious encounter, one that simultaneously enables
imaginary identifications through the site of the skin, confirms the subject’s relation to
the Other, and threatens, like a crashing ocean wave washing over lines drawn in the sand,
to dissolve all psychic boundaries in a flood of jouissance.

Problematically, scholarship on touch and Lacanian theory is practically non
existent, and while unfortunate, this is not entirely unexpected. Charged with
obscurantism and intellectualism, Lacan’s seminars and written works are notoriously
challenging to study. Broadly speaking, his emphasis on the role of speech (the signifier)
and sight in subject and identity formation evacuates the possibility of touch from his
conceptual framework. Still, as substantial sections of this thesis have attempted to prove,
touch can and should be theorized in relation to Lacan’s theories on subjectivity, desire,
drive, and jouissance. One area o f this thesis, however, that remains shaded by
uncertainty is the status of misrecognition in relation to touch. While we have posited
several theories as to how touch might function within the Lacanian imaginary, it is
unclear if and how the alienating experience of the mirror stage would translate from the
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visual to the haptic field. Here we might heed the advice of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who
criticizes the crude distinction often made between the visible and the tangible. He
insists:
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the
tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and
that there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched
and the touching, but also between the tangible and the visible (“The
Intertwining” 251-52)
Merleau-Ponty’s argument, which emphasizes the chiasm between the visible and the
tangible, draws attention to the shortcomings o f Lacan’s theory of the imaginary. For
those privileged with sight, the visual field plays a crucial role in forming the ego and the
dynamics o f psychic life. Equally as important, however, is the axis of the ego that
accounts for the sensation-traces that are recorded on the surface of the skin. Our efforts
have barely begun to account for the complex models that are necessary to amalgamate
the intricacies of Lacan’s visual apparatuses with new topographies that would chart the
sensations and significations involved in the perception of skin contact.
In closing, we’d like to return to a passage in Seminar X I where Lacan recounts a
scene that speaks to our inquiry into touch. Strikingly, upon reflecting on the significance
of the fort/da game, Lacan admits that:
I too, have seen with my own eyes, opened by maternal divination, the
child, traumatized by the fact that I was going away despite the appeal,
precociously adumbrated in his voice, and henceforth more renewed for
months at a time-long after, having picked up this child-I have seen it
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let his head fall on my shoulder and drop off to sleep, sleep alone being
capable of giving him access to the living signifier that I had become since
the date of the trauma. (63)
At the heart of this intimate scene is a longed for encounter, the pangs of which are
expressed in the plea for the return, but the return of what exactly? Surely the young boy
desires to be in the arms of Lacan, and indeed this appears to be the case. Lacan tells us
that after picking up the child and holding him in his arms, the child regains composure,
becomes calm, and drifts off to sleep. This is, however, only a temporary arrangement.
As Lacan discloses, the child’s appeals are renewed continuously despite providing the
wished for embrace. Sleep, Lacan claims, is the child’s only means of accessing the
“living signifier,” which Carolyn Dever argues stands for the lost object, “the maternal
absent presence” (48). She continues, reminding us that sleep “represents an abdication of
agency, an abandonment of physical rigidity, and the emergence of language in dreams.”
Somewhere then, between the realm of the dream and the bounds of the corporeal, touch
remains a forever-missed encounter-yearned for, yet always just beyond our reach.
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